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ABSTRACT

The topic of Divine love is no longer taken seriously. In some sense it is difficult
for one to even utter the words “God is love” without an accompanying mawkish
sentimentality. One’s concept of love in general, and Divine love in particular, is a
linchpin to all other theological, ethical and social spheres of life. This thesis considers
how John Milbank, the “father” of Radical Orthodoxy, understands Divine love, and
some ways in which his work may be positively situated in the Ecclesial Community and
lead individuals into deeper experiences of such love. Since Milbank has very few
explicit words concerning Divine love, his consideration of such will primarily be drawn
out of his most prominent theological and philosophical understandings. That is, this
paper will, in some sense, extract Milbank’s understanding of God’s love from his most
significant and over-arching structures of thought (e.g. his participatory ontology,
considerations of “the gift,” and his Doctrine of Divine Simplicity).
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INTRODUCTION

For what reason would there need to be another lackluster study on the topic of
Divine love? The topics of love in general and Divine love in particular are old hat and
have become tritely familiar -- they appear to have been thoroughly inspected, ad
nauseam. The topic seems exhausted and has been covered, at least tacitly, by an
insurmountable number of thinkers. 1 Prima facie, it does not at all seem as if there is
anything new to contribute to this topic, therefore the aforementioned question deserves
attention - - why the topic of Divine love here and now?
In one of his very rare moments of clarity on this topic of love, Milbank offers
explanation for why it must be reconsidered:
Love is the proper topic for the early 21st century because in the
personal field there is a crisis over its meaning; in the religious field
there is an increasing substitution of violence for loving persuasion and
finally in the world at large the global tightening of human bonds is not
accompanied by an equivalent increase of solidarity secured through
the exercise of charity. 2

1

E.g. Plato, Aristotle, St. Augustine, Aquinas, Luther, Max Scheler, Jean-Luc Marion, Heidegger, Derrida,
DeLubac, Kierkegaard, Karl Barth, Schleiermacher, Paul Tillich and Kant.
2
John Milbank, “The Future of Love: A reading of Benedict XVI’s encyclical Deus Caritas Est,”
(http://www.theologyphilosophycentre.co.uk/papers/Milbank_TheFutureOfLove.pdf), Date Accessed April
24, 2008, 1.

For Milbank, it is clear that love has been horribly misconstrued, and such false

2

impressions have resulted in significant losses for everyone: the individual, the religious
community and all of society. If love, when misconstrued, has such catastrophic
consequences upon society, then how much greater the consequences when Divine love is
not properly considered?
Perhaps this topic of Divine love is no longer taken seriously. In some sense it is
difficult for one to even utter the words “God is love” without an accompanying mawkish
sentimentality. The phrase no longer carries with it a profound earth-shattering sort of
power that affects people significantly - - it is no longer considered dense, rich or fecund.
This topic of Divine love has, as an expression, become socially empty, stale and void of
theological potency. The phrase is tired and has been so oversimplified that it has become
insidious, banal or simply irrelevant in the minds of many in the ecclesial community.
Why has this become the case? Should not this idea that “God is love” carry with it a
formidable, existential sort of consequence upon those who consider its meaning and
ramifications? Perhaps the phrase lacks such a presence because society in general, and
the ecclesial community in particular, has been so shaped by modernity that Divine love
is no longer considered a mysterium. 3 Perhaps the secular considerations of love - overtly influenced by modern thought - - have seeped under the cracks of the doors of
the Parish in such a way that the mystery and aporia have been removed from the
ecclesial considerations of Divine love. Left in the place of mystery is the presupposition
that there is no real substantive difference between God’s acts of love and finite ones - the two are univocal. If there is no real substantive difference between finite and infinite
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This is, as we shall see later, the primary contention Milbank has with his good friend Jean-Luc Marion.
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loves, then there can be no significant interest and intrigue in God, for God is left looking
like the average joe.
It should go without saying that the Christian narrative entirely depends upon its
pronouncement of the presence of a loving God. Without a loving God, there can be no
incarnation, no “highest good,” and no significant Christian professions. 4 It is clear that
much is riding on this concept of Divine love; so much so that it would be imprudent to
presume that the topic has been fully understood and exhausted. 5 For to presuppose so
much is to assume a full, complete, pure and certain understanding of God as he exists
within the God-head; to assume that he has revealed all of himself to humanity and that
finite persons are capable of fully understanding such revelation. Instead, this topic of
Divine love must be taken to be as vast and as infinitely dense as the very God who
possesses “it” and acts it out. 6 Therefore, Divine love must be carefully reconsidered in
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The incarnation, as we understand it, could not be possible for a number of reasons, but here we will only
point out that in order for God to place himself in this world, there must be a sort of care for it and for
humanity. The absence of love is the presence of indifference or hatred. Jesus would have no reason to
enter the world and be present among a creation which he hates or is indifferent towards, much less offer
any sort of message of hope. Additionally, there can be no “highest good” because such good must have
origination in a good God. Without a God of love, there can be no God who is good for goodness must be
expressed outside of a person to others.
5
Perhaps this topic of Divine love, as understood by finite persons, is constantly changing or transfiguring
in some way. This is not to say God is in process (as found in John Cobb, Griffin, A.N. Whitehead) or
even that our collective understanding of him is growing, progressing or becoming greater in quality.
Instead, what is suggested here is that each person should express love and desire differently, and if such
love and desire originates in God, then Divine love is expressed uniquely and differently in the world along
with each individual. Every person offers something singular and unique to this finite world; a unique
voice to this symphony of voices, and with it, another distinct and exclusive way of perceiving The Divine
and love. Each individual brings into the world her own remarkable, God given expressions and
perceptions of Divine love. This is not to say that what has been considered or believed about Divine love
should be overthrown or discarded, but simply that it is, as a phenomenon, in flux -- there is an ever present
inundation of differences which each individual may offer. Every person may contribute something unique
to how Divine love is seen communally. This is not to say that Divine love as understood by finite persons
is constantly under revision or progressing towards perfection, but instead as movement in and through
finite persons, as the Divine action of love is and moves.
6
There is, in Milbank’s thought, a sort of equation of God and his love. This is due to his Doctrine of
Divine Simplicity, which lends to his understanding of God as a person who is eternal action in general and
love as such an action in particular. Milbank sees love as an incredibly fundamental action which God
expresses in his esse.

order to circumvent serious distortions of this fundamental component to the Christian
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message.
Another reason for further consideration of this topic of Divine love is that one’s
concept of love in general, and Divine love in particular, is a linchpin to all other
theological, ethical and social spheres of life. 7 How one perceives herself as being loved
will, perforce, affect her comportment and influence how and what she loves otherwise.
That is, if she believes that God does not love, then she will have difficulty handling the
disappointment of other’s failed loves. One’s choice to not recognize and believe in a
God who loves should necessarily lead one to a nihilistic, and therefore grim outlook on
life and humanity. One’s recognition (or lack thereof) of being loved by the Divine is an
integral component to her comportment and being in the world. Paul Tillich, a relatively
modern thinker, points out that “most of the pitfalls in social ethics, political theory, and
education are due to a misunderstanding of the ontological character of love.” 8 That is,
love is such a fundamental “concept” that it has a viral effect upon all other spheres of
life. Do not such implications of a misconstrued concept of Divine love merit another
careful consideration of this topic? There are questions and answers within this topic
which have been infinitely deferred, and yet it seems to remain true that there is more to
be found and discovered - - more questions and answers that are available here and now.
At this point it has been made clear as to why it is prudent to reconsider Divine
love, but a foreboding question remains to be answered: why John Milbank? He has been
the repeated interlocutor of a great number of articles, essays and theses as he has gained
7

Paul Tillich, Love, Power and Justice, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), 25.
“life is being in actuality and love is the moving power of life.”
8
Ibid. 24.

overwhelming attention. Generally, John Milbank evokes one of two responses from
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scholars in the field: he is either (1) questioned for his frequently suspicious readings and
treatment of Augustine, Aquinas and other prevalent historical figures, or (2) praised as
the father and ringleader of a new and exciting theological movement which is attempting
to rekindle the Christian flames which can be traced to the historical, primordial Christian
message. The virtue of Milbank’s theological presence is still debated, yet one thing is
certain: regardless of the direction from which scholars consider Milbank, he evokes and
awakens new and fresh dialogue. As a result, many trace his every move with a
quivering pen and the result is a heady number of writings that consider Milbank the
prime subject (or in many cases, suspect). Therefore, why yet another reflection upon
John Milbank and his theological influence?
John Milbank is the father of Radical Orthodoxy - - one of the most fascinating
theological movements today - - and as such he has gained admiration, notoriety and
widespread popularity. John Milbank has influence. Because of this influence, it is
important that we become aware of how he sees this topic of Divine love that is so
fundamental to the Christian tradition. He is presently engaged in the most influential
theological circles and his work is finding its way through the doors of the church,
therefore it is imperative that we better understand in what ways Milbank’s thought (or
re-interpretation) may help (or as some would suggest, hinder) the church.
Additionally, there is a very small handful of people who have such a vast
knowledge of pre-modern philosophy and theology as well as contemporary postmodern
thought- - John Milbank is one of these people. Generally, Milbank’s technique for
replacing modern establishments is to renovate the framing and foundation of pre-modern

ideas with postmodern updates and a flashy exterior. It is helpful to consider how
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Milbank does this with the concept of love, for if the idea of Divine love has been
popularly misconstrued, and modern ideas are the culprit, then such a corrective should
find root in pre-modern sources. Because Milbank wields such knowledge of these
sources, he seems to be one of the best individuals through which we may gain a fresh, or
at least an unearthed, perspective of Divine love. If there is going to be anyone who is to
provide a corrective to the aforementioned problem of Divine love, it seems as if it is
going to be Milbank. Though many of his positions have been considered, this present
topic of Divine love is unlike any project yet to be drawn from his writings. Enough
justification has been given in order to necessitate this project, for we have established
(1) why Divine love is an essential topic, and (2) why John Milbank is the ideal candidate
for such a consideration. It is now necessary that we illuminate what this thesis intends to
show.
The aim of this thesis is fourfold: This paper means to (1) indicate the
significance of the concept of Divine love and how it has been popularly misunderstood;
to (2) clearly show Milbank’s understanding of Divine love, and its distinction from
modern, popular versions; to (3) suggest that Milbank has a truer grasp of Divine love,
and that his understanding provides something of a corrective to the present, misguided
considerations; and to (4) pose some ways in which Milbank’s understanding of God’s
love may be positively situated in the ecclesial community and lead individuals into
deeper experiences of such love.
This paper attempts to pack a one-two Milbank punch: not only is Milbank the
prime subject of this paper, but he is also the inspiration for its style and motif. There are
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three ways in which Milbank has prompted this thesis: The first is that this thesis is born
out of a recognition that there needs to be a theological re-narration of Divine Love, and
such a reconsideration has come from the model provided by the Radically Orthodox
community. Milbank’s theological ambition arises from the desire to re-vive and
invigorate the Christian story for the present milieu through re-consideration and re-

narration - - this paper has similar aspirations. In Milbankian fashion, 9 This paper intends
to show that a reconsideration (or re-narration) of the Christian understanding of Divine
love is necessary as humanity’s understanding of it has undergone a sort of devivification which has left the concept lacking in significance for the contemporary
audience.
The second way in which this paper is rightly Milbankian is found in the thesis
that Divine love has been popularly misunderstood to some degree and a number of such
false impressions have come about through modern thought. Much has been forgotten
amidst the modern products of empiricism and philosophies limited to finite confines. As
a result of modernity, the phrase “God is love” has been stripped of imaginative,
powerful and potential meanings as all sense of mystery has been removed. Milbank
generally begins his works with problems he detects in theological discourse; issues that
are the result of negative influences of modern thought - - this paper begins similarly.
The third way in which Milbank’s thought has shaped the construction of this
paper is found in the promotion that certain pre-modern understandings reflect a truer
grasp of Divine love. This thesis supports Milbank’s continuous claim that there are
9

Albeit, this paper will not be quite as polemical, heavy-hitting or dense as Milbank’s own theses
combating modernity, and, hopefully, this thesis will not be seen as imprudently blaming modernity for all
social problems in general, and a misunderstanding of Divine love in particular.

specific pre-modern theologies that we should employ to speak to our contemporary
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predicament of a misconstrued Divine love. Milbank’s overt disposition towards premodern thought will be definitively obvious throughout the paper. This paper will be
reflective of such sentiments.
Now that we have considered the purpose of this paper and the style through
which it is to be gone about, it would be helpful to see the way in which the purposes will
be achieved. Since Milbank has very few explicit words concerning Divine love, his
consideration of such will primarily be drawn out of his most prominent theological
understandings. That is, this paper will in some sense, extract Milbank’s consideration of
God’s love from his most significant and over-arching structures of thought (e.g. his
participatory ontology, considerations of “the gift,” and his Doctrine of Divine
Simplicity).
Chapter one will consider the theological landscape, features and texture of
Milbank’s Radical Orthodoxy (henceforward referred to as RO). Prior to delving into his
understanding of Divine love, it will be indispensable to consider his approach to
language and his theological agenda and ethos. RO merits far more attention than will be
addressed here in this thesis, and this chapter will only highlight some of the general
features of RO, which significantly color and affect Milbank’s thought.
After understanding Milbank as RO, the second chapter will consider what
Milbank means in speaking of love in general, and Divine love in particular. This
chapter will also explore a bit more how this topic of Divine love has been misconstrued
in contemporary theology. In general, the modern theological understanding of the

attribute or act of God’s love has lost its potency as it has been stripped away from his
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other attributes. Too much emphasis upon one of the attributes, results in the
diminishment of other major perfections, thus leaving God narrowly pinned down to
acting in and through one attribute at a time. Another way of examining Divine love in
contemporary theology is to see the polarity between the considerations of God as
strongly immanent or as extremely transcendent. 10 An over-emphasis on either of the
two poles has resulted in disparate, and erroneous views of Divine love. Both the
strongly immanent positions and extremely transcendent ones each have their own unique
considerations (or disqualifications) of Divine love, and such views, if found erroneous,
must be reconsidered. Therefore, it is hugely important that this perfection be considered
further, especially within a “sensitivity” that is gaining such attention - - albeit
notoriously at times - - and respect.
Chapter three consists of how Milbank’s understanding of Divine love may be
tacitly drawn from his participatory ontology - - a significant feature of his theology.
Milbank would agree with Augustine in his suggestion that “God does not know all
creatures, spiritual and corporeal, because they exist; but they exist because He knows
them.” 11 In other words, God even sustains humanity’s existence - - every breath is
allowed by God. This sustainment is the basis for Milbank’s participatory ontology.
Such loving provisions are God himself, as he makes himself known and perpetuates a

10

This sort of imbalance between transcendence and immanence is most prevalent in process theology ( by
way of A.N. Whitehead, John Cobb and Griffin), liberation theology and more emphatically, Open Theism
(this topic of love seems to be the very thrust behind this theological movement. Greg Boyd and Norman
Pittenger seem to be leading the way here). On the other hand, there have been strands in modern and
current thought that kick God out of the phenomenal realm (e.g. Deism, Bultmann’s Demythologization,
and on a much smaller scale, Karl Barth’s theology) and leave humanity to fend for itself in a world
without an immanent God.
11
Augustine of Hippo. De Trinitate, (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1963), XV, 13.

relationship with humanity in general, and individuals in particular.
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In the fourth chapter we will see how Milbank considers the concept of “the gift”
and its relation to this topic of Divine love. “The gift” is not so much an ontological
category, or a strictly phenomenological presence, and this lends to Milbank’s fascination
with it. “The gift” may be considered as a way to speak of love, God, and God’s love.
This chapter will consider the connection between God’s expressions of love as it relates
to his giving of the gift(s), and humanity’s reception of it/them in relationality.
Milbank’s concern for Marion’s proposed univocity between finite and infinite loves will
also be considered in this section, for it is precisely within this realm of giftedness that
the concern rears its head.
The fifth and final chapter of this thesis will emphasize the infinite distinction
between humanity and God. Since the Divine is infinitely and, in Milbank’s case, wholly
other than man, God must retain a mysterious nature which is exclusive from humanity’s
perception. 12 Since, for Milbank, all loves are ultimately an aporia, then we should
consider Divine love to be at least doubly ambiguous, for it involves both the infinite,
mysterious God and love - - an ultimately puzzling and mystifying subject. Milbank
speaks of Divine love somewhat reticently; that is, he takes great care in drawing
conclusions on this topic. A proper devotion to understanding Divine love is, ironically,
found in staying committed to its mystery and obscurity, and yet open to and hoping for
12

The Greek work used in the Septuagint for “mystery” is sacramentum, which best translates as “the
secret counsel of God.” The word is also related to “sacrament” which is best described as something “set
apart.” For a deeper consideration of the living tension between revelation and mystery, see John Milbank
“Only Theology saves Metaphysics: on the Modalities of Terror.”
(www.theologyphilosophycentre.co.uk/papers/~Milbank_OnlyTheologySavesMetaphysics_final.pdf), 55.
Milbank points out that “Of course, there is the problem of how we can recognise radically new things or
search for unknown ones, but Plato and Augustine recognised that our strange anticipation of the unknown
is radically aporetic, and requires an appeal to transcendence (in terms of recollection or illumination), on
pain of denying the arrival of the new as something still rationally coherent.”

generous revelation. 13

13
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See Pascal, Pensees. trans. A.J. Krailsheimer. (Harmondsworth UK: Penguin, 1966),125.
Pascal recognized finite limitation and recognizes humanity’s arrogance in understand and expressing love.
In efforts to highlight the significant transcendental character of God, and to suggest that humanity pales in
ability to rightfully perceive God and the love he is. He suggests “all bodies together and all minds
together and all their products are not worth the least impulse of charity. This is of an infinitely superior
order. Out of all bodies together we could not succeed in creating one little thought. It is impossible, and
of a different order. Out of all bodies and minds we could not extract one impulse of true charity. It is
impossible, and of a different, supernatural order.”
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CHAPTER 1
JOHN MILBANK AS RADICALLY ORTHODOX

Once again, it is helpful to understand Milbank as he is Radically Orthodox, for in
his qualification as such we may gain a significant amount of insight into his means,
method and style in theology. This chapter will begin with how Milbank considers
theology in general, then we will see how his considerations apply to his theological
endeavors. As this chapter progresses, we will see the project of RO more clearly, where
Milbank is situated within such a project, then we will slowly progress into considering
some of the more broad features of RO as they are related to the particular thesis in
question: Milbank’s understanding of Divine love.
We must be careful not to assume we understand what Milbank means in using
the word “theology,” or else we may end up missing a great deal of his contributions to
the discipline. It is first necessary that one consider the what character of Milbank’s
theology in order to understand what he means in speaking of theology. The task of
theology is to pinpoint the peculiarities of Christianity and to untangle them. For
Milbank, theology is a practice of finding a new language for these differences “less

tainted with the over familiarity of too many Christian words which tend to obscure
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Christian singularity.” 14 This position is clearly reflected (albeit not always so clearly
stated) in Milbank’s often-esoteric writing style. What is clear in his writings, however,
is that theology, as an imaginative enterprise, must be done with efforts not to conform or
theorize, but to create and imagine. The task of the theologian is to keep theological
discussion fresh through a sort of re-narration of the Christian story. Milbank would not
suggest that the story must change, but rather that the story must be retold with
meaningful language for the present society. 15
“Radical Orthodoxy” is radical in the sense that its adherents attempt to capture
the radix, or “root,” of Christianity, and it is orthodox in the sense that they wish to live
within the basics of Christian belief, which have been traditionally accepted in historical
Christianity as right and true. 16 Though Milbank embarks on his theological projects in

14

John Milbank, “Postmodern Critical Augustinianism: A Short Summa in Forty-Two Responses to
Unasked Questions,” in The Postmodern God, ed. Graham Ward. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 267-74.
The idea that this practice is essentially ‘music’ would be an example of this ‘making strange” Which
Milbank sees the need for. Theology must be approached with a realistic concept of how a human, finite
being might go about this within her reality; a reality “suspended between nothing and infinity is a reality
of flux…composed only of relational differences and ceaseless alterations.” Milbank wants to draw
attention to the reality that there is no formulaic wisdom one may magically invoke and thereby avoid the
difference within society and the Church. This, for Milbank, is to attempt to escape from true human
discourse which should include new occurrences stemming out of true differences. These differences,
which are so essential to human-ness are held in contempt in modern society, as they may get in the way of
the contemporary virtues of ease, comfort and power (and perhaps violence). For Milbank, this variability
within human discursiveness must be valued, and is valued by The Divine, for the “atonement means that
the flux is permitted to flow again, that the Logos only really speaks with its real intent in the ever-different
articulation of our responses. The Holy Spirit is associated with this diversity of answers.” Of course,
Augustine, in De Musica, does not have as strong of a reaction against the fixed essences as does Milbank,
but there is here a sense of difference within community and a harmony of those differences which must be
pursued and enjoyed. This is much more like what Augustine seems to be getting at.
15
Ibid. 267-74.
As discussed in the opening remarks of this thesis, this topic of Divine love may be, for Milbank, one
which has become so overly familiar that it needs a re-telling more fitting for the contemporary ecclesial
community.
16
Graham Ward. “Radical Orthodoxy and/as Cultural Politics,” in Radical Orthodoxy? A Catholic
Enquiry, ed. Laurence Paul Hemming, (Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2000), 106.
“There is not one Christian tradition…for orthodoxy is broader than might at first be believed… [for] views
on the Eucharist or even the sacraments more generally, may differ, but these are not grounds for
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an avant-garde sort of way reflecting a certain freshness, he is also clear about intentions
to retain the antiquity of Christian thought and orthodox tenets of belief. Therefore,
Milbank is on the cusp of two theological curves – one which holds to traditional
orthodoxy and another, seemingly more risky endeavor, which attempts to redraw the
Christian faith in a fresh language.
RO is not a corrective erected as a movement in order to offer fundamentals or

systematics, but rather constituted as a “loose tendency” 17 a “theological sensibility” 18 or
a “hermeneutic disposition and a style of metaphysical vision; it is not so much a ‘thing’
or ‘place’ as much as it is a ‘task.’” 19 This style of considering RO is reflective of
Milbank’s persistent polemic against a modernity chock full of theories and systems. The
simple thesis for Milbank and RO is that everything -- every sphere of life -- is either
theological or anti-theological. 20 All ideas in society are theologically prompted; that is,
all of the ways in which one views him-self and his world stem from his conceptions of
God -- one’s perspective as a finite being attempting to perceive the infinite. One’s
understandings of God will overlap into all of her other facets of life. For R.O., this ontotheological vantage point should lead to the revisions of philosophical thought void of
theological discourse and claiming independence from the religious and theological

heterodoxy.” Ward continues to point out that there are some core beliefs which, if questioned, would
remove one from being considered orthodox.
17
Catherine Pickstock, “Reply to David Ford and Guy Collins,” Scottish Journal of Theology ( 54, 2001),
405.
18
Graham Ward, “In the Economy of the Divine: A Response to James K.A. Smith.” PNEUMA: Journal
of the Society for Pentecostal Studies (25, 2003), 117.
19 Catherine Pickstock, “Radical Orthodoxy and the Meditations of Time,” in After Writing: On the
Liturgical Consummation of Philosophy. Challenges in contemporary theology. (Oxford, UK: Blackwell
Publishers, 1998), 63.
20 It seems as if Milbank uses “Anti-theological” as opposed to “atheistic” to draw out the ever present
theological reflections of those who would consider themselves a-theists. Milbank subtly suggests that
even those who are a-theists still have a sort of theology, just one which does not claim the existence of a
God.

spheres. 21 Because of these demands RO places upon philosophy they see the need to
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more closely consider the continuum between philosophy and theology. Milbank
suggests “theology generously supplies to philosophy a dignity higher than mere
autonomy.” 22 This sort of dignity which Milbank speaks of allows philosophers to (1)
not check their theological considerations at the door of their philosophical pursuits; and
(2) allow those who practice philosophy an infinite reserve; to posit a creator being into
their reflections. Orthodox Theology posits that there is a supernatural beginning and
ending to all things; and one who considers herself in that narrative must see the
evocative influence it has on philosophy. This necessitates the philosopher to place all of
his theological cards on the table, so to speak. To see the necessary continuum between
philosophy and theology is to discard the raw reason of modernity and to reclaim reason
as fused with faith. This reclamation of reason leads to a revival in the philosophical
enterprise - - a taking for granted core Orthodox Christian belief. 23

Radical Orthodoxy as Recovery
Milbank is opposed to the modern consideration of theology’s antithetical
disposition to other disciplines and social strata - - the societal compartmentalization of
disciplines is a prime product of a society knee-deep in a vastly modern era. Therefore, a
central part of the R.O. manifesto is to point out that there was an historical period in
which society and its civil structures were in recognition of the finite connectedness with

21 Interestingly, Milbank is presently (February 2009) considering Heidegger and his relation to RO’s
present tasks.
22 John Milbank. “The Gift and the Mirror” in Counter-Experiences: Reading Jean-Luc Marion, Ed. By
Kevin Hart (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 308.
23
This is a sort of presuppositionalism which takes Christian thought to be perfectly within the limits of
reason as there has been no de facto defeaters to such beliefs.

the infinite. Smith concludes that the material world “of nature itself was not simply
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‘nature’ but creation-- a materiality or ‘charged immanence’ curved toward the
transcendent.” 24 That is, until Duns Scotus introduced a univocity of being, as opposed
to the prior ontological framework characterized by the consideration of an analogical
nature of being, a framework last touched by Aquinas. 25 As we will discuss in chapter
four, Milbank opposes Marion’s univocal understanding of love, for it does not attribute
enough infinite difference between The Divine and human persons.
Augustine will be laced throughout this thesis as we see his influence upon
Milbank’s work. Here it is helpful to consider Augustine’s relation to RO in a broader
sense. Milbank and RO have been collectively criticized for hijacking Augustine for
their postmodern agendas. On the one hand, the RO community exercises a fair amount
of freedom in their use of Augustine, and Milbank applies him to a broad range of
theological matters and subjects almost incessantly; but on the other hand they do seem to
be getting at the heart of Augustine’s message: that of God’s love and the effects of such
love upon the ecclesial community. 26
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James K.A. Smith, Introducing Radical Orthodoxy: Mapping a Post-Secular Theology, (Grand Rapids
MI: Baker, 2004), 88.
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Surely R.O has a much more complex explanation as to who, when and why Modernity, as a time period,
is generally the whipping boy for the suggested ontological problem. R.O. traces this problem back to
beginning exclusively with Duns Scotus.
26
They seem to interpret Augustine somewhat liberally – to spread him thinly across a variety of topics.
Would Augustine have difficulty with how RO seems to interpret his text? Perhaps it may be prudent to
consult Augustine’s “theory” of textual interpretation for insight into how he would like his text(s) --any
text -- to be interpreted. It seems as if Milbank and RO would be confident that they are interpreting
Augustine in such a way that they are building the caritas Gemini (the double love of God and neighbor)
and are hoping to help others in such in pursuit of such loves. Augustine seems fairly lucid in explaining
his theory of interpretation to be polysemiotic so long as the interpreter finds meaning which builds up the
double love of God and neighbor.
See also Augustine of Hippo, De Doctrina Christiana, Trans. D. W. Robertson, (New York: Liberal Arts
Press, 1958).
This quasi-polysemiotic position is most clear in his On Christian Doctrine, where he poses that text is
meant for a reader to find a lesson useful (i.e. the most important part of understanding is the outcome) in

17
Though the primary thrust of RO is the recovery and reclamation of a lost
orthodoxy, RO both commandeers and demeans postmodernism to achieve their goals.
RO embraces the idioms and dialects of postmodernism and pays homage to its
continental ancestors (e.g. Heidegger, Derrida, Nietzsche, de Lubac). 27 However, they
also wield a polemical -- almost sharp -- tongue towards some strands of postmodernism
for being still too modern and inevitably nihilistic. Nevertheless, for the members of RO,
postmodernity poses a wonderful opportunity to once again redeposit the transcendent
and infinite concerns --vis-à-vis the Divine -- into philosophy, largely because it
recognizes the “unknown and indeterminate in every reality.” 28 This reinsertion of a
Christian metaphysic will necessarily be more potently philosophical. 29 In order to
remove the modern death grip on philosophy, it is essential to identify the modern
ontological blunder, for one’s understanding of being and ontology churns her
philosophical framework. Milbank points out that “on a non-‘Scotist’ understanding of
esse, we only are as we love and remain in love, whereas God who is love cannot not be.
the building of love for God and for humanity. The goal of understanding is to locate meaning which
proves to be helpful to the individual in her ability to find the good in the Divine and in humanity.
One’s going about textual interpretation in search for personal meaning is “ like a man who leaves a road
by mistake but passes through a field to the same place toward which the road itself leads. But he is to be
corrected and show that it is more useful not to leave the road…” Clearly Augustine is not implying some
no holds barred view of text; instead he recognizes what the goal of interpretation is, and the he has
realized the reality of misinterpretation due to both human finiteness and depravity. Nevertheless,
Augustine sees the significance of an interpreter’s efforts to understand the author, for when one does this,
the text is most potent and significant.
See also Augustine of Hippo, quoted in An Augustine Synthesis. by Przywara, Erich. (New York, NY:
Harper & Bros., 1958), p.335.
Augustine claims that “charity, therefore, is the law of God.”
27
RO looks most like the nouvelle theologie, those who were concerned with turning the modern tables of
modernity over within the church in order to retrieve the theological vision of the ancient and medieval
sources, and thereby an Augustinian influence was laid bare.
28
Unknown author. “Radical Orthodoxy: Twenty-four Thesies,” thesis 7. Quoted in James K.A. Smith.
Introducing Radical Orthodoxy: Mapping a Post-Secular Theology (Grand Rapids MI: Baker, 2004), 43.
29
Though, of course, no one needs permission to establish their philosophy upon the transcendent God,
there is currently, through a postmodern window, much more of a willingness for one to allow his
philosophy to rest upon an infinite resource for explanation.
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God loves-to-be.” 30 For RO, being is necessarily hooked to love, for to-love is to-desire,
and in order to exist one must love some-thing or desire some-thing. The Divine gives
man existence through an expression of love; love to be taken and love to give; love to
participate in.

A Radically Orthodox Ontology
Milbank, in opposition to the strict ontology of immanence, proposes a
participatory ontology that posits the finite’s dependence upon an ultimate transcendent
source. In the place of a strictly immanent understanding of God, there is, within
historical Christianity, a stream of thought that suggests a graceful dependence upon the
transcendent giver. A consideration of Milbank’s ontology is necessary in order to better
grasp his perspective of God’s love, for such an ontology is fastened to, if not contingent
upon, Divine love. The modern ontology of immanence is countered by Milbank’s
participatory system that is “attended by an ek-static, transcendence-oriented
anthropology and an account of social relationships that begins with peace.” 31 They want
society to function without violence, as does Augustine’s city of God. Part of the R.O.
agenda is to see this participatory ontology take root and see the ideas grow legs and
enter society. 32 Through this ontology, R.O would like to provide an account of
“intersubjective” relationships that are centered around the virtue of charity and love as
they stand against the vices of unbridled power and might. For if there is a community in
30

John Milbank. The Word Made Strange: Theology, Language, Culture. (Cambridge,MA: Blackwell
Publishers, 1997), 49.
This reflects Milbank’s Doctrine of Divine Simplicity, which we will look further into later in this thesis.
Emphasis mine.
31
James K.A. Smith, Introducing Radical Orthodoxy: Mapping a Post-Secular Theology, (Grand Rapids
MI: Baker, 2004), 188.
32
Ibid. 186. This is an alteration of James K.A. Smith’s “ideas have legs.”

which God and his love are the focal point, then this is the ideal society: one in which
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reciprocity occurs between individuals who are participating with the loving God.

The Sacred and The Secular
Milbank is embroiled in a polemic against forms of thought that claim human
autonomy from The Divine. For Milbank, the concept of “the secular” was not originally
a fabrication of modernity, but its presence today is thoroughly modern as modern
thinkers have carved it up to be a rather misinformed version of secularity. Through
modernity, social theories in general, and political science in particular, have claimed
autonomy from the sacred. Thus, the sacred has been insidiously purged from the secular
fields of the modern life. The modern premise of secularity is that one may live
autonomously without any dependence upon The Divine or his love. 33 In fact there are
certain spheres of life which should be void of God and one’s conception of him. Reno
picks up on Milbank’s sentiment quite well in his consideration of the earthly, modern,
secular city. Reno points out that in such a city, a “natural human being” is one who is
no longer “natural” for Milbank sees a “natural” human as having been created “for
citizenship in the heavenly city.” 34 The most organic component of humanity is built-in
inter-relatedness with God; this is, in large part, what makes humanity as such.
Milbank indicates that there should be a reconsideration of the sacred-secular split
so prominently featured in contemporary society. This sacred-secular division is
33

See also T.F. Torrance, Karl Barth: An Introduction to His Early Theology 1910-1931, (Edinburgh: T&T
Clark, 1962), 60.
Torrance poses that in the wake of Kantian epistemology, theology had become the “predicate of what is
essentially and universally human and hence even revelation could only be acknowledged and handled as a
confirmation of man’s own latent possibilities or of his own analysis and self-understanding.”
34
R.R. Reno “The Radical Orthodoxy Project.” First Things. (Feb. 2000,
http://www.firstthings.com/article.php3?id_article=2542).
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presently stark in western culture in general and, in Milbank’s case, the United Kingdom
in particular. As an Anglican, Milbank has seen the constitutional monarchy of the UK
shape and affect his ecclesial community; a secular society attempting to banish sacred
parish life to its own corner of society.
Though the secular realm did not begin in the modern time period, Milbank still
polemicizes the secular, for in it society lives in a make-believe world in which there is
no sacred influence or effects of God’s existence. Upon the creation of this secular
realm, attempts were made to kick God out of its affairs, for God had nothing to do with
the finite ambitions and societal governance it created. Milbank traces this dawn of a
secular society and claims that it was the beginning of an ontological system that “both
flattened the world and unhooked it from the transcendent thus creating a new space
untouched by The Divine and an autonomous reserve of reality outside the religious.” 35

This led to the emergence of the secular domain in society and man’s independence from
God, an independence necessarily leading to nihilism for without the material’s
suspension from the transcendent, it is left to dissolve into nothingness. This is the
product of a philosophy void of theology. Being and knowing cannot work independent
of Christ and Divine love. For Milbank, The Christian God is not simply one who is a
first cause, but one who loves his creation and invites them into the triune interrelatedness. He loves though they have sought to live independent of his presence. Not
only does man attempt to be independent from God, but his independence is prolonged
by degeneration and underpinned by sinfulness. Smith points out that for R.O., “the
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James K.A. Smith, Introducing Radical Orthodoxy: Mapping a Post-Secular Theology, (Grand Rapids
MI: Baker, 2004), 88.

effect of sin is found in man’s loss of an original supplement.” 36 This original

21

supplement is presently absent in the relata between man and God. Such a supplement in
relationship is the adhesive that keeps the finite in touch with reality. A participatory
ontology, which is nourished by the authentic doctrines of redemption, sin and creation,
can alter the ways in which man necessarily recognizes his contingency upon the infinite.
As the Radically Orthodox Graham Ward points out in his Cities of God, “nature cannot
be natural without the spiritual informing it at every point.” 37 That is to say, the most
normal and regulative way of life for the finite is one constantly informed by the Divine
life. The “spiritual” sense is always manifested in the corporeal sense, and RO hopes that
the Ecclesial community may pay more attention to such spiritual senses.

The Benefits of RO upon the Ecclesial Community
While John Milbank and The Radically Orthodox are not particularly in the
business of doing practical theology, they anticipate their work finding its way to the
broader ecclesial community and eventually to those outside that community. Milbank
and RO are optimistic about the direction the church is headed, as they have hopes for
some practical parochial changes and reversions. In what ways does Milbank, as RO,
provide a better understanding of Divine love to the Ecclesial community? Does his
consideration of Divine love offer any positive contributions to the church? There are
two ways in which Milbank’s Radical Orthodoxy may contribute to such a community.
The first is found in RO’s hope for ecumenism. Milbank claims that RO is
persuasively ecumenical and as such, attempts to re-unify the Church based upon its
36
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Ibid. p. 157.
Graham Ward, Cities of God, (New York NY: Routledge, 2002), 88.

primordial heritage. 38 Albeit not a reunification that establishes a new catholic or
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universal order, or by denouncing the differences among protestant denominations, but
instead a re-unification that attempts to draw all persons closer to the roots of Christianity
and consequently Divine love which is for all persons. Milbank wants to be as
ecumenical as possible, and claims that RO has a particular diagnosis and “a set of
specific recommendations” for how the Church must return to the primordial roots of
Christianity. 39 He sees RO as the sensitivity that may very well be the first truly
ecumenical theology in modern times. RO claims to reflect both Catholic and Protestant
traditions, and has set its sights upon re-unification around primary tents of belief that do
not necessarily favor one of the traditions over the other. RO is able to do this, whereas
neo-orthodoxy was specifically Protestant and nouvelle theologie mostly Catholic. For
Milbank, RO may be helpful to any communities or denominations seeking out the roots
of the Christian tradition, and hope for a new ecumenism. 40
Generally, when a corrective or critique is provided, it is narrowed - - geared with
a certain particularity - - towards a specific audience. For the more particular the
corrective, the more heavy-hitting and significant it may be for its intended recipients (e.g
a denominational group, a school of thought, a political party). However, Milbank claims
38

When considering the primordial nature of Christianity, it is necessary that one have in mind a time
period, certain figures who are to be regarded as fundamental, and some significant events that make it the
beginning. There seems to be a debate over when, who and what best represents the most pure and
fundamental form of historical Christianity. Generally, protestant thinkers trace roots back to Pentecost
and Paul’s writings, while Catholic thinkers find the purest roots of the tradition at the writing of the first
Christian creeds. It seems as if Milbank finds rootedness in both significant events.
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John Milbank, “Alternative Protestantism: Radical Orthodoxy and the Reformed Tradition,” Radical
Orthodoxy and the Reformed Tradition: Creation, Covenant, and Participation. Ed. James K. Smith and
James H. Olthuis. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2005), 25.
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See Pope John Paul II, “All Must strive for the Goal of Full Unity,”
(http://www.ewtn.com/library/PAPALDOC/jp950712.htm. Date accessed: March 2, 2009).
He poses that “the commitment to ecumenism is of primary importance for the Christian. [...] Jesus prayed
at the Last Supper for the unity of his Disciples, with heartfelt intensity: 'as you, Father are in me, and I in
you, I pray that they may be [one] in us, that the world may believe that you sent me' (Jn 17:21).”

RO to be much broader in its scope and further reaching with its message. The broad

23

scope of RO lends to its being a corrective for the entirety of the Church; Milbank wants
RO to help everyone see the primordial roots of Christian history and juxtapose them
with Christianities present today. RO is not a rival church, nor is it a critique that stands
outside the church doors, instead it is a set of ideas and propositions which are aimed at
the church in its entirety, from within. This is incredibly significant for the Church, as
there has been so much division within it, and such little dialogue between Christian
communities. There is a need to recognize the universal heritage of orthodox belief, and
RO is hoping to draw attention to such; to reinstitute the solidarity among Christian
persons on the basic components of the gospel that have been lost along the way.
The second way in which Milbank’s RO helps the Church is found in his wishes
to see the Church find freedom from a “secular” state and re-establish the participatory
communion between themselves and the Divine. The latter is dependent upon the former
in this case. That is, such a freedom from the secular may only be established once one
recognizes the all-pervading nature of the Divine upon the totality of life, not just the
“spiritual” parts. The world is one of Divine constitution, God maintains a power over
the whole of reality and this is a message that once again needs to be given to the Church.
Though, generally speaking, there is recognition of Divine sovereignty in the
Church, there seems to be lacking the acknowledgement of Divine presence in and
among all matters, not only the sacred ones. Milbank and RO may be a corrective to this
disconcerting issue in the Church, for RO overtly emphasizes a return to recognition of
participation with, and dependence upon, the Divine. Reconsideration of this concept of
Divine constitution could lead to a re-vivification of dependence upon God and growth

24

from and out of finite autonomy. The Christian tradition speaks to God’s involvement in
all human affairs (and gifts) and such affairs necessitate a certain level of reliance upon
God.

Recognition of freedom from the secular should be encouraging for The Ecclesial
Community. The church should not shudder under the modern claims that the Christian
tenets of belief are irrational, but should instead find comfort in its rationality, as the
Christian faith’s rationality is not subject to the skewed empirical scrutiny which
demands proof for all belief. 41 A freedom from the secular should also help persons
reconsider their role in the ecclesial community. That is, each person has a specific role
to play within the Church, and one’s liberation from secular confines should open one up
to the polis of the heavenly city, the City of God. Such an opening would lend to
persons having richer Christian experiences with the living God in community. Perhaps
Milbank would see Christian experience similarly to Hart, as “more of a process than a
distinct event, that it is invariably mediated… and interpretation is integral to it at every
level.” 42 Christian experience, for Hart, is “ for the most part an experience of nonexperience, that is to say, of faith. To be a Christian is not to live at the limit of
experience but to realize that a limit passes through all experience.” 43 This view of
Christian experience places emphasis upon Divine dependence, faith and trust, not simply
past experiences. This turns the concept of experience from emphasizing something
done to the subject, to something participated in, emphasizing a responsibility on the part
41

This is not to say that one should adopt a fideistic view of faith in God, or a disinterest in evidences for
the rationality of Christian belief, but adopt more of a recognition that the ideas of rationality and reason
have been so skewed that the Church does not need to shudder under the wrath of de jure claims to
irrationality directed at the Christian tradition.
42
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Ed. John D.Caputo ,(Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2002), 163.
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of the subject. Surely we can see Milbank supporting this sort of thesis, as participation
with the Divine opens up this sort of faith through experience. Milbank, et al, consider
the church to be running rampant with Modern philosophical ideas of autonomy versus
the theme of faith. Because of this, RO has spoken out about what changes the Church

must make in order to most fully experience Church life in its purest form. RO sees itself
as a thoroughly Christian, faith seeking “movement,” 44 one that hopes to lead others into
such faith.

44

As mentioned earlier, RO would not consider themselves to be a movement. This seems to be because
they prefer to emphasize their orthodox heritage over some of the more unique R.O. manifestations and
such an emphasis upon traditional roots reflects not a new theological beginning, but a reclaiming,
redeeming and retrieval of such roots.
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CHAPTER 2
PHENOMENOLOGIES OF LOVE

“Talking about love may be too easy, or rather too difficult,” as Ricoeur
suggests. 45 If love is going to be considered at all, these tensions must be recognized. On
the one hand, when one considers this topic of love, there is the enormous task to not fall
prey to trite considerations or reflections; on the other, there is the ever-present difficulty
of love’s elusiveness, and its, at times, intangible non-theorizable nature. This may leave
one stumbling in the dark, but this dark should not be thought of as a void, but a sacred
mystery. This topic of love is vast, and in effect shapes all things. Love is both the
answer to the questions that humanity poses about life and the reason for which those
questions are asked. In Chapter five we will discuss how Milbank is convinced that
Divine love may only be discussed analogously, yet, in this chapter we will highlight love
as an act manifested in the world, and therefore available for finite beings to experience
through the disciple of phenomenology. 46 Nonetheless, there are limitations to these
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(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995), 315.
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Perhaps, for Milbank, Divine love may only be experienced when one performs something of a
phenomenological reduction upon her life experiences (e.g. smelling a flower, enjoying a friendly embrace,
or feeling love in most any other experience). Milbank has been quite influenced by what seems to be
Heidegger’s early phenomenological work. In Heidegger’s thought is the sentiment that phenomenology

endeavors, and we do not want to make the “modern” mistake of restricting God’s
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movement to the natural world, nor do we wish to presume that there are not
preconceived notions of love which we, as finite persons, restrict God to. For whenever
we speak of Divine love “we use our experience of love and our analysis of life as the
material which alone we can use.” 47 This does not at all discount all considerations of
Divine love; they are not necessarily corrupt or insipid because of finite consideration,
however one can never be too careful in this discussion of both the breadth and limits of a
phenomenology of Divine love. One should attempt to situate herself along the
continuum between what is too easy and what is too difficult vis-à-vis Divine love -between that which has been revealed and that which is still, and may forever remain,
indeterminate. This chapter will consider how Milbank understands love in general, and
how such an understanding is different from modern phenomenologies of love.

should take over philosophy as it exists. We are to go back to the “things themselves” and to consider life
experience in a new - - ultimately anti-Kantian - - way. For Heidegger, to take a world view is to de-vivify
(de-life-ness) life experience. The aim of phenomenology is not to simply set up a program or theory of
experience, but to experience life itself. Therefore, for Heidegger, to theorize is to take an experience and
remove the life from it. True religious experience (not the Kantian sort of experience) is only found in life
and contemplation. When one recognizes a phenomenon giving itself to him, he should perform the
phenomenological reduction in life, in a pre-theoretical experience. Perhaps this idea has colored
Milbank’s consideration of divine love and its ultimately aporetic nature. In Milbank’s thought we have a
very serious hesitancy to theorize divine love as well as a vigorous emphasis upon individual experience of
God.
47
Paul Tillich, Love Power, and Justice, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), 110.
Tillich goes on to suggest that “We also know that if we apply it to God we throw it into the mystery of the
divine depth, where it is transformed without being lost. It is still love, but it is now divine love. This does
not mean that a higher being has in a fuller sense what we call love, but it does mean that our love is rooted
in the divine life, i.e. in something which transcends our life infinitely in being and meaning.” Emphasis
mine.
Perhaps, here there may be a correlation drawn between Tillich’s to Marion’s views of finite love as it is
considered to be univocally similar to the Divine love. Though this passage reflects Tillich’s panentheistic
leaning, here Milbank may be charitable to Tillich because of the emphasis upon participation or “rootedness” in the divine life. All sorts of finite loves can and must be traced back to the Divine, but a
participatory ontology which suggests that finite beings collectively make up the Divine doesn’t seem to be
at all what Milbank wants to affirm.

Milbank’s Phenomenology of Love
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Infinite love is available to humanity, yet only detectable in part. Though Divine
love is discoverable through the phenomenal realm, it is wholly other than humanity’s
version of love - - the two may only be compared analogously. Divine love may be
perceived, yet only and always fragmentarily. For John Milbank, if it were possible to
fully understand and comprehend love, then we would also fully apprehend God, as his
love is an act of his nature; his very being, if you will. 48 Though it is helpful to discuss
love, it can seem precarious to attempt to box Divine love up, package it and present it as
a fully disclosed phenomenon. Though it is beneficial to qualify what is meant by love,
we must hold the qualification loosely and in tension with how we qualify God.
This consideration of Divine Love cannot solely be a phenomenological
enterprise, though it “is certainly an unavoidable gesture since all that is, by token of its
excess over nothing, shows itself or gives itself.” 49 An essential part of humanity is the
ability to perceive and respond to what is perceived - - to apprehend and arrest a
phenomenon as it gives itself. The human is always affected by what is sensed
irrespective of his or her wishes on the matter, yet it takes effort to not merely recognize a
phenomenon, but also pay attention the experience the phenomenon may bring. To
perform a phenomenological reduction on Divine love begins with a certain thetic
relation to such love, a certain interest which one finds in a phenomenon. Perception
plays a large role in one’s understanding Divine love, and it may very well be that one
chooses not to identify such love (to not perform the phenomenological reduction),
48

Much later in this project we will discuss Milbank’s subscription to the traditional Doctrine of Divine
Simplicity, which is so fundamental to his understanding of Divine love.
49
John Milbank, “The Gift and the Mirror” in Counter-Experiences: Reading Jean-Luc Marion, Ed. By
Kevin Hart, (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 277.

29

however, the human ability to perceive should not lead to an assertion of autonomy from

the Divine. On the contrary, to perceive and do phenomenology should lead one to more
dependence upon the Divine, the one who gives. To perceive is to receive and to give, to
take in and to release. If this is true, then one must conclude that phenomenology cannot
simply be an independent enterprise of perceiving but also one which posits a Divine
being at the heart of what is being perceived. This is where Milbank enters the
conversation, for if we may posit a Divine being into creation as we go about our
phenomenological endeavors, then we have an opening up of The dialectic between
phenomenology and ontology – an ontology that posits a reserved being into its
framework who gives and sustains. The significance of such a consideration should lead
to recognition of Divine mystery and the consecration of Divine love.
Therefore, in Milbankian fashion, we will proceed with this topic of love as if it is
discussable but also as if we should not be too sure of ourselves in the discussion.
Because Milbank has not defined love clearly, then, in this thesis, we will operate
likewise. For to attempt to define something Milbank considers indefinable seems
presumptive. Instead we will begin with what Milbank has considered to be valuable in
the discourse of Divine love, and we will later consider his need to see it, ultimately, as
an aporia.

Divine Love, by Definition
In the obvious, more strict sense, human love is defined by Divine Love, yet in
another sense, our experiences of human love provide a definition or outline for what
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Divine Love is like. This is what makes phenomenological projects seem so elusive, for
in our finite perception, everything begins with what we see, sense or have been given
By our senses we determine how the world is, and though this is true for Milbank, our

senses cannot be the final say on all that is. This is because the transcendent God moves
in ways unperceivable to the finite – there are things going on in the finite realm which
are not able to be perceived by finite beings. So Milbank takes God’s existence for
granted and allows his phenomenology to give way for supernatural intervention as all of
nature is always being sustained by The Divine. Milbank sees God as the cause of man,
and therefore, the one who gives definition to finite loves. This definition, sustainment
and intervention calls for Milbank to recognize the need for a concept of being which is
strictly influenced by The Divine act of love, for “human love can only be defined by
Divine love, in which it remotely participates. This is why charity is a grace, a
supernatural infused virtue.” 50 Even finite love between persons, as an ability, is a gift,
for it opens us up to seeing and being capable of perceiving Divine love. However, we
do not know how exactly to define Divine Love because there is so much our finite
senses have not perceived, so much sacred love that we cannot assume we understand.
Therefore “we can only define it as we remotely see it in nature, amongst humans,” and
this definition must be held loosely, always reflecting a Divine love which is infinitely
more than we can ever experience or say. 51
In his work Le Phenomene erotique, Jean-Luc Marion affirms that humanity is
first loved before ever taking the risk of loving another. 52 Milbank seems to accept
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Marion’s premise that “God is not because he does not have to be, but [because he]
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loves.” 53 This, for Milbank, is to say God is precisely because he loves, as he loves tobe. That is to say “God is love,” and operates out of and within that love. Love has
always been, and it must begin in God. This is one point on which Milbank agrees with
Marion, for one cannot create love on her own, ex nihilo, but must depend upon a Divine
love which is first given. Now, this perception or recognition is not what actualizes the
love, but love, as a gift, existed prior to the creation of humanity. Even in humanity’s
post-lapsarian state does love remain, though fragmentarily. Milbank suggests that if
man is not first loved by God then man could never be able to love him-self, others or
God. For how can a being posit that he is caring if he does not recognize his being cared
for? Love, then, for Milbank, could never spring out of an evolved being who stands at
the end of a chain of causes; desire and love are, perforce, human characteristics
established by the Divine. An evolved humanity would look quite different from the
humanity that we have, perhaps human life would look much more like a fungus or an
amebic parasite that simply is. 54 However, though finite love is possible, it is not
necessarily actual - - it involves labor, and is always limited to discontinuity. Finite love
comes in waves.
It is difficult to love ourselves properly, though there is an inherent selfishness
around and within us. Milbank confesses that he (Milbank) is “inherently hateful and can
It would be interesting to know if Marion consider’s love similarly to Augustine and his concept of things.
If so, then man could not even exist as he does, for without Divine love there would be no desire in man for
any-thing or person; there would be no loves at all.
53
Jean-Luc Marion quoted in John Milbank, “Can a Gift Be Given? Prolegomena to a Future Trinitarian
Metaphysic,” Modern Theology (11, 1995), footnote 157, emphasis mine.
54
This once again emphasizes the significance of Divine love upon human existence, and perhaps love’s
overpowering ontology. For if ontology is the most basic structure through which we are to study human
life, and the means through which that life is lived is love and desire, then such an account of being must be
colored by love.
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only come finally (as the most difficult act of love) to love myself because miraculously - and without reason, without any recognition of anything in me that is objectively good
and so lovable - - someone has first loved me.” 55 This Divine love provides a baseline
for humanity that allows one to see herself as lovable. It is within finite love that we
interact with Divine love for “to love is to proceed within a process of love that
reflexively contemplates and actively gives – a process that begins before us, flows
through us, and continues on after us.” 56

Modern Phenomenologies of Love
Within Modern society there have sprung up a number of ways to perceive love.
It has been considered, quite broadly, as an emotion, a chemical, a state of mind or even a
language. Perhaps it is not so easy to place love into one of these categories. Once love
is removed from emotion it becomes stale. When it is no longer chemical, it is detached
from the physical. If love is not, in some way, a state of mind, then it does not take
cognitive labor to focus upon it and develop it. At best, these secular attempts to qualify
love have not satisfied Milbank. Love has become both disparaged and praised all in the
same breath. Because the word “love” is culturally difficult to interpret, it is imperative
that the Christian populaces further consider how finite love is determined by a Divine
love. Love, as expressed in and through God, is not simply a commodity, but a necessary
part of life for man, and there must be a way in which God has inserted himself (and ipso
fact his love) into finite history. The only way in which the Christian God can be loving
55
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is if he crosses the immanent/transcendent divide. This means that The Divine would
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need to be both drastically transcendent and piercingly immanent (though, at times,
Milbank has been criticized for erring on the side of a more transcendent God). The most
singular and perfect example of God’s harmonious transcendence and immanence is
found in the incarnation of Christ -- the gift of presence but utter, and wholly other,
distinction.

The Incarnation
The incarnation is the quintessential, phenomenological instance of Divine love.
Divine Love, as the summation of all things good, can be considered
phenomenologically, but only because of Christ’ incarnation. 57 For Milbank, agape is an
interpersonal event - - an institution of connectedness, and therefore man can both
understand and practice a love that is related to that of the Divine. This is because man is
“given the true shape of love in the form of love…” 58 and it is Christ, as the revealed
Word of God, who exhibits love and provides humanity with the example of how to love.
The fall of humanity is the refusal of Divine love and therefore no one can “in any way
57
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know love without reference (conscious or unconscious) to the event of the full arrival of
love in time, which is the Incarnation.” 59 For Milbank, it is precisely because of the
incarnation that love can even be spoken of. In the fall love was in some sense lost, but
the incarnation restores human ability to love properly and is “in a sense already there
immediately after the banishment from Eden as the New Testament and the Church
Fathers make clear.” 60 Perhaps, for Milbank, love has never skipped a beat because
Christ is always present in time past and time future and thus positing a prevenient grace
after the fall. This very well could be Milbank reflecting his claim to Augustinianism, as
Augustine views time not through a linear lens but instead more synchronically as events
do not evolve throughout history but instead stand alone in relation to other occurrences
in history. 61
The negative debt of the fall has been repaid through the God-Man entering our
world and the incarnation is the point at which Divine love enters into the finite realm in
a finite, human body. The incarnation is the most potent theurgic work, a powerful
phenomenal result of divine operation. It is through this act of incarnation “alone we

learn what love is.” 62 That is, for Milbank, love can only be experienced by finite beings
as it has been expressed by the Divine, infinite being. The Christ came because humanity
needed an example of love, and in the Gospel narratives, Christ built his church upon
59
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“the practice of love that alone discloses its reciprocal and distributive nature.” 63 The

35

incarnation is, in Milbank’s version of love, an historical turning point. Of course, this is
an act of Divine love, for both the message of Christ and the act of incarnation are
persistently described as gifts.
Within our finite understanding of ontology, we can begin to consider what
relation being has with love, and how ones consideration of them should be colored by a
reconsideration of the one who expresses them in their most pure forms. As father of
Radical Orthodoxy, John Milbank suggests that there is much more to be understood
once we consider Divine revelation through The Christ. Humanity’s deepest need is
Divine love, however, humanity is often blind to this love and, as we will later discuss,
bent towards the rejection of it. Therefore man is in need of Christ to reincarnate his
most organic desires. 64 Humanity is sick and loves things improperly, most frequently
ignoring the desire for relationship with God. 65 Milbank would suggest that only the
incarnate Christ could remedy this ailment. 66 This remedy is found in God’s stepping
into the world in order to aid man in recognizing him. Christ brought opportunity for
63
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finite man to live with the infinite God. Milbank suggests that “‘incarnation’ means that
participation in the divine relational life is restored.” 67 Incarnation, then, should be a
signpost of the love and holiness of God, and as an event, “revises the ontology of the
finite world, conjoining it through the body of Christ eternally to God.” 68 Therefore,

there is a need to view ontology in light of Christ’s advance toward man, not inversely as
humanity has autonomously attempted. A total recall of ontology must be made for
“God is constituted as love also by his advance toward humanity, also by his experience
of identification and abjection in the Incarnation and his ascended return from this to the
relative formality of spiritual presence among us.” 69 Such an ontological recall would
revamp how humanity views itself and God because it properly frames love as a gift - one of advance, identification and presence. It is in this vein that Milbank views the
incarnation, for God must cross the abyss man has created and God must worship himself
in time - - as Christ - - as the exemplar for humanity.

Jean Luc Marion’s Ontological Blunder
Milbank critiques Jean Luc Marion (a contemporary of the nouvelle theologie
movement) for having an ontology that is far too detached from his Christian theological
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understanding. 70 Marion’s is an ontology bent around a univocal understanding of being
and it doesn’t seem to reflect the difference between the essence of God and that of man.

Marion has devoted much of his work to the development of a phenomenology of love - one which is Christian and ultimately unambiguous due to his univocity between the
infinite and finite loves. As a result of having further considered Marion’s supposed
univocal concept of love, Milbank concludes that “God is alone the stable and infinite
lover,” 71 and as such has a completely remarkable love. Milbank points out that there
clearly is a difference between how one may speak of humanity’s love and how one may
speak of God’s love. Though finite love may be considered as a reflection of the infinite
love, it is nonetheless a pale comparison to Divine love. This sets the separation between
Marion and Milbank, for if God alone is the one who truly loves, then God’s love must
be wholly other than man’s - - though we have a sort of trace of that Divine love in our
own loving and being loved. Therefore,(as Milbank suggests) we do not have a univocal
concept of love as Marion purports. Milbank denies Marion’s univocal understanding of
love because it does not account for the difference between humanity’s love and The
Divine’s. A consequence of Marion’s univocal understanding of love would be that the
topic of love (human or otherwise) may be fully exhausted through phenomenological
means. This, for Milbank, poses an infinite number of problems because it does not
allow God to reserve mystery with a love different than our own, nor does Marion’s
account take into consideration of God’s simplicity. So Milbank properly frames the
question:
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If love applies univocally to God and to us, and if only God redeems us
from the problem of love achieved in language that is at once too
formal and yet too out of control, then who will redeem Marion’s ontic
God who is like us in structure, only infinite – in other words, Marion’s
onto-theological God – from what one must presume to be God’s own
predicament of negation of incarnate negation that must also remain at
once too formal and unidentified and too threatened by contamination
by the abjected bride of Israel or the church in her whorish aspect? 72
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Here, Milbank points out a problem in Marion’s ontology: God’s love is claimed to be
just like humanity’s love. Marion’s God, as he relates to human entities, is simply an
infinite version. Marion cannot recover from these issues and in the end cannot offer any
real phenomenology of love, but instead “only another metaphysics of nothingness and
absence.” 73 For Milbank, Marion has not taken an understanding of given-ness and
applied it to his ontology. Alternatively the result of Marion’s phenomenological project
ends in nothingness because it doesn’t allow God to have an essence other than our own.
In other words, God cannot stand outside of Being, is trapped within and thus bound to it.
What then is a proper replacement to Marion’s univocal understanding of esse,
and consequentially, love? Milbank poses that only a Platonic, analogical, participatory
ontology can allow for God’s love to differ distinctly from finite loves. Additionally, this
ontological revision, must be balanced with a semiotic (the study and interpretation of
signs and symbols) reconsideration of “given-ness.” That is, an at root grasp of how even
humanity’s existence is given by God. In the place of Marion’s univocal concept of love
is one that Milbank purports to attribute similarities, but most importantly, differences
between the finite and infinite loves. There must be a difference in loves; a difference
that promotes participation and reciprocity.
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Milbank’s Phenomenology of Love and its contribution to The Ecclesial Community
In this section we will consider the significance of phenomenologies of love in
general, then we will discuss how Milbank’s phenomenology of love contributes to the
good of the Church. This topic of love has a significant worth to the Christian
community. Whether it is one person attempting to love another, or it is one’s having a
personal experience of Divine love, the Church may benefit from further considerations

of love. Love is both the telos and object of all desires. 74 This topic of love should not to
be taking too lightly, and it would be beneficial for everyone to hold loosely their
considerations of love. What we may learn from John Milbank on this topic of love is
that it is something everyone understands through lived experience, whether such
experiences of love are mostly attended through broken-heartedness, or through ecstatic
desires that lend to positive memories of loves fulfilled. Words have a significant
handicap in this topic of love; and yet it is prudent to consider the theoretical nature of
love, as thetic features affect lived experience.
It is always beneficial to consider and reconsider this topic of love unless, for
example, one understands love to simply be an inner, unalterable impulse which one may
only simply respond to. Instead of such a deterministic view, this thesis presupposes that
there is a sense in which one’s thoughts - - and in particular, thoughts of love - - will,
perforce, show themselves in her loves, desires, relationships and professional life.
Under this assumption, Milbank’s phenomenology of love may help us reconsider the
74
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various strata of love and, as a result, have our thetic perspectives turned in such a way
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that our lived experiences will also turn. In other words, the truth (of love) will set one
free. One’s life should and will change as a result of her having her very own
phenomenology of love.
We will now begin to discuss how Milbank’s phenomenology of love is
significant for the Church. Milbank’s is an ontology that places love at its heart. By
doing so, love becomes the be-all, end-all standard for one’s being. For one’s status asbeing is only because she loves, she desires. This would call for a change in how the
Church understands love and humanity. The Church has been, in large part, considering
humanity primarily in terms of his being. That is, it seems as if the Church is primarily
focused upon man’s ontological nature, and what Jesus has done to re-organize that
nature. 75 In the Church, for example, rarely do discussions of sin ever include
considering the object of one’s love while in-sin. Instead, this topic of sin is only
discussed on the terms of how man’s very being is infected by said sin, or how Jesus
transforms one from being inherently sinful to being spotlessly redeemed. Sin, when
discussed in the Parish, is only considered in terms of its “what character,” the
ontological effects of sin upon humanity - - man’s being-in-sin. Milbank would surely
agree that the church, as well as the theological community, have a limited ontological
vision that began in the modern time period. Milbank is calling both communities to a
drastic ontological re-vision that re-inserts love into our considerations of being. For
humanity, to-be is to-be-in-need, to desire.
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Love (and likewise desire) is both something to give and something to receive.
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For Milbank, love is both a resource (poros) and a deficiency (penia). To lack is to
desire, to want more, to hope to receive. The Church should consider such desire as a
part of being-in God’s image. Perhaps a recognition of love-as-desire would lead the
Church to having a new and fresh desire for desire. That is, the Church should take this
concept of love-as-deficiency and in effect, become more aware of present desires, direct
desires towards the good, and thus re-kindle its hope for becoming more Christ-like.
Even so, love is a resource to be channeled to other things and beings - - to-love is
to-give. Love has a lasting affect. And is, in a sense, self replenishing as it is a cycle of
giving and receiving. Milbank points out that love must be more than lack because it
would otherwise be unable to be sought after, to be known. Love must bear a trace in the
cosmos, and Divine love must still prevail in man, at least in part. Otherwise, there
would be no such thing as love for, as Milbank proposes, “love must be always already
actual in order to be possible.” 76 Love, as it should be, exists in God as an action and is,
in part, attainable for man to experience. In order for love to be actual at all, it must be an
integral characteristic of God’s intra-Trinitarian relations. Therefore, the Church may
take this concept and choose to act as if there is more potential to love and to give; to
enter a cycle of poros and penia.
If a significant component of love is desire, then this needs to be introduced into
the Church. In doing so, the gospel message presented by the Church would rightly

76

John Milbank, “The Gift and the Mirror,” in Counter-Experiences: Reading Jean-Luc Marion, Ed.
Kevin Hart, (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 290.

42

reflect both components of love. 77 Perhaps the church would then see the dynamic nature
of love and likewise Divine love. In addition to considering God’s love as something to
rest in, as a static and simple concept in which one believes, there should be a refocusing
upon the dynamic nature of such love as well. That is, there should be a re-ordering of
parish life around the dynamic and mysterious nature of Divine love - - one that would
result in seeking said love in fresh ways. 78
Another way Milbank’s work may help the Church is found in his qualification of

finite love and his expansion of sacred space. Divine love penetrates all things, and every
human love first finds its origination in Divine love. God is not bound to sacred spaces
or the religious sphere. 79 Thus, Divine love may be found everywhere, even in the most
seemingly unsightly places. The Church may benefit from this by seeking out Divine
love in such places, and having greater experiences with that love. No matter what the
conduit, Divine love is always the same in significance and power. Perhaps this love
may come through a Jewish politician, or a Muslim street-vendor. Irrespective of the
source, The Church should affirm every place through which Divine love shines through,
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into the phenomenal realm - - all in order to have greater lived experiences with God. 80
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The Church should not limit its perception of Divine love to the Christian faith
community or necessarily private prayer, for this love surrounds and envelops all of life,
every lived experience. When the Church is appropriately seeing, perceiving and
experiencing that love, it is also participating. Such a re-ordering of how the Church
experiences Divine love would lead to a re-discovery of the natural reciprocity between
God and humanity - - that which occurs indefinitely.
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CHAPTER 3
MILBANK’S ONTOLOGY OF PARTICIPATION

What exactly does Milbank mean when he speaks of “participation?” It is a
highly flexible word in theological and philosophical dialogue, and Milbank seems to
employ it in a variety of settings. J. Todd Billings has offered a very helpful, concise
chronology of participation, and proposes that Milbank most frequently uses the notion of
‘participation as deification.’ Billings concludes that “this doctrine is taught by various
patristic and medieval writers, and was recently re-attributed to Augustine…” 81 The
employment of “participation” runs in the Anglican family, which is Milbank’s
tradition. 82 The most essential component of “participation” though, is that it is rooted in
a “loose set of Platonic metaphysical claims” which attests to an ontology of creation
participating in the creator. 83 The simple premise of this sort of participation is that if
81
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there is a good being who created man, then that being sustains man in some way and that
creator being merits credit for that which he does. Though not thoroughly
comprehensive, these qualifications of ‘participation’ aid us in becoming streetwise with
Milbank’s uses of the word, as we consider its relation to Divine love.

The Modern Problem
The current appeal to an autonomous reason can be considered a product of the
modern mind-set. This autonomy can be best traced to Kant’s Religion within the Limits
of Reason. An essential premise of Kant’s work is that man can survive on his own using
the categorical imperative 84, by which he can (though with tension) act as he thinks he
should. Man can discipline himself and become a person who is consistently active in
bringing about the good and progress in society as a moral person. For Milbank, it is
clear that this sort of finite autonomy has poisoned the branches of modern, secular
philosophy. This is why R.O. wishes to re-establish a philosophy under the Christian
banner - - one which does not fall into the popular presumptions of modernity. Milbank
proposes that “evil is self-governing autonomy - - evil is the Kantian good, the modern
good.” 85 It is this very human problem, this autonomy that drove - - and still drives - man to choose exile from God. This sort of independence was the central motive in the
Genesis account of man’s fall into deprivation.
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Milbank poses a counter-ontology to these modern sorts, one which consists of a
Christian metaphysics assuming reciprocity between God and man. One which “suggests
a state of being that pertains between two or more persons and therefore seems to require
an ontological description…” 86 Love is an interpersonal phenomenon which doesn’t
simply exist as a subject receiving or a subject giving. For Milbank, love occurs in,
among and between people; there is an interpersonal and inter-onic nature of love. Love
cannot exist solely within the parameters of an individual void of an object of love, for
there must be a beloved. Milbank proposes that if it were possible to love without a
beloved then the lover would “appear merely to be in love with the idea of selfabandonment.” 87 There must be an object of love, otherwise love is reduced to nihilism.
Also, love must be considered within the scope of a participatory ontology, for “without a
continuous overlap with Being, love can never refer to something or someone loved…” 88
The presence of a God who loves must drive us to a drastic revision of ontology.
Without considering love as it relates to ontology, love can only be a sterile and stale idea
- - only conceptual but never virtual. Milbank argues that love, void of ontological
considerations, would then be reduced to a formal structure that is never actualized.
For Milbank, a participatory ontology that places God at the helm has as its
foundation the logic of creation as gift and a robust restoration of such a gift. Creation is
a gift given out of love, and as such necessarily affects the intrinsic nature of humanity.
86
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All of creation was brought about in love, therefore it has its being in love (ex amore). 89
This event of creation was an event forged in love, but love is also a permanent state or
reality of those created; that is, they are permanently inter-related with the creator. To

consider an ontology of love is to recognize that “to-be is to-be-related. Creation is then
conceived, not as ex nihilo, but as ex amore.” 90 Participation and ipso facto love, relies
on the very fact that there is something given and returned between two persons - - a gift
given and received.
A Neo-Neo-Platonism
Augustine is primarily responsible for taking this neo-Platonic concept of
participation and making it distinctly Christian. Tom Jacobs poses that this sort of
Christian neo-Platonism “makes it possible to overcome a strict division between God
and world, by understanding everything as participating in the divine.” 91 Though the
division is necessary for Milbank, it mustn’t compromise the revelatory immanence of
God. In order for Milbank to maintain a dynamic Christian God, he must deny the static,
solely transcendent one of the former neo-Platonism. In order to account for this
potential pit fall, Milbank employs Augustine’s concept of the Trinity to account for the
dynamic difference. God is not a unity of being beyond difference, but is instead
“superabundant being” unified in difference. 92 Therefore, creation is invited to
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God is an eternal, constant loving and inter-relating.
From here, it should not be a difficult task to see the relation between Milbank’s
concept of participation and his position on Divine love. For Milbank, participation is a
mark of the Christian’s identity, for one cannot love “of one’s own originality and
without necessarily seeking any communion.” 94 That is, a communion between God and
man; one which establishes man’s loves upon The Divine love. This concept of
reciprocity reflects Milbank’s position on the gift, which we will consider more fully in
chapter four. God gives, and the greatest gift he gives is himself, and this prepares man
for his presence - - his final and beatific kingdom. Love is essentially bound up in one’s
making himself present to care for another – this is the gift of reciprocity. It is meant to
be a relationally charged ontology through which God’s love is recognized as being at the
helm of every interaction between God and man.
Love and the good are intertwined. For Milbank, in order for love to exist at all,
there must be a participatory ontology that recognizes the-good of being and how such
good is also being participated in.

If the good (in this case love) cannot be participated

in, then it does not exist, for it must be shared. This is one of the most recognizable
attributes of love. 95 Participation establishes the roles of man and the role of God in the
creative and redemptive processes. Milbank’s highly platonic system aims to readjust the
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modern mindset of autonomy. A mindset that is highly resistant to recognizing any sort
of dependence upon the Divine. In contemporary theology, there is, on the one hand, a

community who denies finite dignity and ability apart from Christ, and on the other hand,
Christian strands that attest to man’s ability to pull himself up by his own theological
boot straps. Neither of these polarities seem to be certified by Milbank. Instead, a
theological system that is founded upon the relational connection between the finite and
the infinite drives Milbank’s structure of reciprocity - - reciprocity that is not made up of
two equally sharing and giving parties, but one in which humanity depends upon and
borrows from The Divine. We are to respond to the gift of love donated through loving
as we are loved (John 15:12). In his Gospel account, John indeed suggests that we must
respond to being loved and to “give what is initially not in our possession.” 96 For
Milbank, this implies that there is a sense in which man’s love must be first donated by
God, and is thus an exchange. When man loves in the right direction, he is being donated
such love by God.
The central theological framework used by R.O would be a platonic 97 scheme of
‘participation,’ but in a new wineskin. This participatory casing sets man in a position of
dependence upon God, not in turned position. Though this system sets God at the
fulcrum, it does not deny finite things dignity but instead properly sets the finite things in
a position of living out their full finite potential. Milbank’s participatory ontology does
not inhibit finite persons, but actually allows for the finite to be most truly finite and to
live in the most-true, naturally human form as a result of the sharing which the Divine
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initiates. Such an emphasis upon participation necessitates that persons may only truly
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know through participation in the Divine, and would be, otherwise, reduced to a bare
existence, one of finite autonomy. 98 Milbank borrows much of his ontology from
Aquinas who also seems to find such an autonomy out of place in a world which is
sustained by God.

Participation and Aquinas
Milbank is calling for a serious revival in philosophy that would result in the
shattering of philosophy’s autonomy, for, as he suggests, philosophy should be
reorganized due to Christ’s existence and redemption. Here Milbank appeals to Aquinas
- - one who did not have an autonomous philosophy void of theological concerns. There
are ways in which Aquinas had an exclusively Christian Philosophy, one which
expressed starkly different dependencies than those upon which Modern philosophies
have been founded. Milbank has concluded, “the metaphysics of participation in Aquinas
is immediately and implicitly a phenomenology of seeing more than one sees, of
recognizing the invisible in the visible.” 99 This sense of participation with the Divine, or
“seeing more than one sees” is surely a linchpin in Aquinas’ theology. Perhaps Milbank,
here, is mostly taking contention with the broader philosophical community that does not
attempt to incorporate God in the process of understanding the fundamental nature of
98
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reality. Milbank’s understandings of metaphysics and ontology are, by and large, shaped
by Aquinas’. 100
In word and deed, Christ claims to be the “testimony to the truth”(John 18:37).
However, though Christ embodies the infinite truth, man’s activity in the finite world is
lived in half-truths. Because man is meant to live informed by the infinite, he is

unequipped to live a truly finite life without the Divine. Milbank points out that “to be in
truth is ‘to correspond’ to God in whom we participate.” 101 This participation is, at root,
an agreement (correspondere) between God and man, built upon a Divine promise to
answer and respond. The two parties are constantly agreeing upon what is, and what is
good. Truth, for Aquinas, does not restrict, but enhance one’s life of finitude - - truth is
always freeing. If man chooses to live autonomously, he cuts himself off from the source
of truth; from the Absolute. Similarly, Milbank sees knowledge as something we can
only grasp in part; at times we may see it more clearly, at others more dimly. This is the
necessary finite situation as “crucially, there is only one guarantee of truth – only one
source of light – which is God’s own knowledge.” 102 Therefore, to fully know all truths
is to fully know the source of said truths. Milbank also seems to hint that the only truth
one may find confidence in is that humanity may not fully attain truth and knowledge.
However, there is a way man may experience knowledge - - he must participate in the
Divine knowledge. For man may only have knowledge of the world “by participating in
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its constant generation, as gift and return…” 103 for to have knowledge is to interact with
truth; to live coinciding within reality. On this matter of truth, Milbank appeals to
Aquinas:
[There is] no judgment of truth without assessing a degree of
appropriate participation in the transcendental attributes proper to
divinity, though this is not to say such an assessment need always be
carried out with full reflexive consciousness of the proportio between
creature and creator. But were one to attempt to comprehend a finite
reality not as created, that is to say not in relation to God, then no truth
for Aquinas could ensue, since finite realities are of themselves nothing
and only what is can be true. 104

Aquinas’ “light of faith” is in reference to creation and its participation with the divine
light. That is, as man receives the light of faith, he is moving from obscurity and
variation in thought toward pure intuition; toward a lived experience with truth (though
still in a dimly lit room). Put simply, in participating one is growing in knowledge. This
is not the doing of man but of God, who is infinite. The finite is contingent upon the
infinite, and man’s pure intuition hinges upon his connection with the Divine, for, as the
Psalmist wrote, “…in your light we see light.” (Ps. 36:9). God, then, is the fountainhead
of light, in that he is constantly creating and recreating such light for the world to see, and
by which to see. The Divine makes truth visible for man, stimulating finite sight to detect
authenticity. If God imputes and sustains all truth in the world, then the finite may only
borrow truths and live out of them through imitation and impression.
One’s participation in God necessarily limits her autonomy. Instead of attempting
to theorize within one’s own mind as to how to live in the world, the finite can learn and
develop the ability to imitate the Divine. Imitation is then the means by which man
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interacts with himself, God and the world. For Aquinas, “borrowing is the highest
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authenticity which can be attained. One must copy in order to be, and one continues only
as a copy, never in one’s own right.” 105 It is in our imitation of the divine that we receive
truth and participate with the Divine as image bearers. However, the image is not
reflected as it should be. Milbank interprets Aquinas as understanding the post-lapsarian
state of man to be one of dire significance, for man’s ability to participate has been
ruptured. This ability must be restored, and it is through the Incarnation that one can
once again participate in “the divine understanding.” 106 Truth and participation
correspond with one another, for insomuch as man participates with the Divine, he is
interacting with truth accordingly. Necessarily, then, things can only be true as they are
conjoined and sustained by the Divine.
For Aquinas, it was not necessary for God to be appeased through the incarnation;
however, this was fitting and supremely suitable for God’s intentions. Milbank refers to
Aquinas’ consideration of the incarnation as ‘convenient;’ that is, an appropriate action
selected by God, but not the only means through which God could have brought
redemption to humanity. 107 This somehow turns the logic of the Incarnation on its head,
for within such a view the aesthetic gesture of the incarnation may be more significantly
appreciated. Aquinas’ concept of participation reflects this view of the incarnation as
aesthetic. Milbank suggests this convenience, “as applied to the divine economy of
creation and redemption signals, in Aquinas, an aesthetic construal of participation: God
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creates, and is partially disclosed within, appropriate proportions which radiate according

to their inherent integritas.” 108 Hence, participation, as an aesthetic gesture, is designed to
give pleasure – a pleasure found in experiences with truth and love.
Aquinas utilizes “the neo-Plationic legacy and the metaphysics of participation to
show that he regards our capacity for thought not as a ruefully humiliated endeavor, but
as a partial receiving of divine intellection.” 109 Man is capable of thought, inspiration
and action. All of these capabilities are dependant upon the Divine. This is love, for
these capabilities are a gift and should be identified as such. Additionally, though
humility is a virtuous quality, Aquinas’ participatory framework is not intended to point
out man’s deficiencies, but rather God’s sufficiency to supply humanity with all of its
needs; to be sufficient in all its concerns.

Participatory Ontology and The Material
The created order is “a plan that is ordered to praise,” for “all the world is a
sacrament,” and “this generates a sacramental revaluing of the material.” 110 This esteem
of the material is refreshing and significantly distinct from the devaluation of the material
found in Platonism and the dualistic Manichaeism. God has wrapped man in a material
body that was originally intended to channel love into the world. For if embodiment is
essentially good, then the body is a gift given to channel goodness and consequentially,
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love. A corporeal God who also gives bodies is not the Deus ex Machina, 111 but the one
who has created humanity with a unification in mind, a reciprocity. Instead of being the
divine puppeteer of Deism, who may only create nihilistic beings, God created the finite

with a contingency upon himself with, and for purpose. As discussed earlier, Milbank, et
al., wish to have a God that is both transcendent and immanent. 112 Catherine Pickstock
suggests that if reality were to be considered within a hierarchy, transcendence would be
at the top of such a scale, where all other forms of reality would be at the bottom.
However, this doesn’t mean that God, in his transcendence, isn’t connected in some way
with that which is on the lower rungs of this hierarchy. Pickstock points out that God is
ever present to the ants and even down to “the ants legs.” 113 Though God is beyond
being, finitude and all limits, “there simply isn’t a place that transcendence cannot be”
because “it is beyond all limit, yet it works in and through every limit that we have.” 114
That is to say that God can enter the finite and interact with it, but he is far beyond being
finite. He even transcends man’s understanding of infinitude as he cannot be categorized
according to finite nomenclature.
However, God reveals himself in nature –the material - through that which is
beautiful. Beauty, for Milbank, is the mediation between the invisible and the visible.
Beauty is the platform on which the invisible makes itself available. God uses his beauty
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This beauty is for man to participate in, but not to necessarily take as his own (which he
accuses modernity to have attempted). This gives shape to Milbank’s ontology, for if the
gift of beauty is meant to point man’s attention back to the giver, and man can only be the
steward of that which God has given and man is, himself the gift of beauty, then one’s
existence must be, in some sense, necessarily sustained by God.

Milbank’s Participatory Ontology and its relation to The Ecclesial Community
This concept of participation should have immense consequences for the Ecclesial
community. Milbank wants to see parish life re-orgainized around this sense of
participation, for “the central theological framework of radical orthodoxy is
‘participation’ as developed by Plato and reworked by Christianity, because any
alternative configuration perforce reserves a territory independent of God.” 116 Milbank
wants this participation and exchange - - that God has established with humanity - - to
affect all sorts of social exchange. What then, would be the implications of this sort of
participation for the Church? What might parish life look like after this re-insertion has
found its footing? Here, we will consider two ways the church would be different if it
thoroughly adopted Milbank’s participatory ontology: The first is that, instead of the
mirage of autonomous ecclesial survival, there is a sense in which the Church recognizes
its dependence upon the Divine order. This is not so much of a revision to how the
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church considers the sovereignty of God, but rather its relation to such a God. This
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destructive autonomy may not always be blatant, but rather subtle at times, coming in the
shape of human potential, progress and development. This autonomy has also found root
in formulaic conceptions of how one may become holy by his or her own rite. Though
holiness an obvious virtue, it should not be confused with morality. Holiness may only
be brought about by God changing the individual, whereas morality is a product of ones
own desires, initiative and discipline to become a better person. Though morality is a
value for society, it may be achieved independent from the Divine. Morality (moralis,
“manner” or “character”) does not necessarily require any sort of faith, trust or
dependence upon God, and should be more cautiously considered. 117 The church,
therefore, should be encouraged to pursue true holiness that may only come through faith
and trust in the Divine - - not the self. Holiness is brought about through relationship
with the Divine, there is an appropriate sort of self-abandonment that comes in such
participation and relationship. Instead of violence, dependence and faith upon the Divine
results in, and perpetuates peace. Such peace leads to an appropriate vigorous spirit to
aid others, to lead them to the good, and to the source of such peace and goodness - - the
Divine.
The church may also see, through this lens of participation, that in such reciprocal
interaction, one is taking a part, playing a role, in the greater good, the common good.
One is, in a sense having a stake in the good that is being brought about in the world.
117
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One devotes and invests her-self, her being-in-the-good. The church exists in order to
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promote the good, and in order for the Church or the Christian individual to be in good,
they must participate. That is, the good may only be achieved through participating with
God, in the heavenly city (not in the earthly one characterized by finite autonomy).
Therefore, the church’s very existence is circumscribed by participation, and the church
should re-organize its benevolent acts in the community around this idea of participating
with God, in the good.
Milbank’s understanding of participation also helps the church to have greater
communal experiences. One who is actively participating with God is also participating
with others who are actively participating with God. This is what the Christian concepts
of community should be formed around. The church exists in order to tear down societal
structures and groups that characterized by their exclusivity. That is, the Church should
embrace difference and deny the secular format of structuring around similarity that
results in exclusions. There is a sense in which secular society is negatively built around
such compartmentalization (e.g. social class, financial status, profession, physical
appearance, abilities, etc). The church should not allow such forms of societal exclusion
to enter its doors. Instead of the church organizing itself around exclusive similarity
comparable to secular organizations, it should embrace difference and promote all
person’s participation in the Divine, not exclusively, but inclusively. One’s participation
with the Divine should be the defining characteristic of her communal participation. This
is the sort of conversation that Milbank’s participatory ontology should awaken within
the Church. We will now turn to Milbank’s understanding of “the gift,” where we may
easily trace his disposition towards exchange and reciprocity with the Divine.
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CHAPTER 4
MILBANK’S UNDERSTANDING OF “THE GIFT” AND “THE GIVEN”

Milbank’s conception of the “the gift,” as it relates to the Divine gift, will be the
focus of this section. One can better grasp the Divine gift through phenomenological
consideration of “the gift.” What though, qualifies as a gift? If a gift is given solely with
the intent of receiving something in return, then does said gift lose its qualification as
such? This section will consider the qualification of a gift as such, as well as some ways
gifted-ness is a gesture of Divine love.
For Augustine, “Gift” is the name for The Holy Spirit, and this is a starting point
for Milbank. 118 Through The Holy Sprit, man is invited and ushered into the Trinitarian
“exchange.” And Milbank confirms that God, in giving his Spirit (the gift), fully gives
himself to the Son and fully “consigns himself, as giver, to this infinite form, shape or
image of his donation.” The Spirit brings persons into this Trinitarian exchange yet man
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must choose to participate in this love. 119 For Jean-Luc Marion -- Milbank’s inspirer on
this topic of giftedness -- Husserl began to develop the insight “that, in its basis, every

phenomenon surges forth as a gift, and therefore that all phenomenality comes to pass as
a donation.” 120 Marion is undertaking a project after Milbank’s own heart: that of repairing theology and philosophy. More specifically, Milbank borrows Marion’s
development of the gift and love as such a gift. All phenomena are gifts and Milbank, as
a theologian, most often considers “The gift(s),” in the context of the Divine’s giving of
them. God holds the perfection of love and expresses it as a gift, without fault. This
should escort the finite into worship -- or ethics -- and recognition of Divine infinitude.
However, the gift-exchange between God and man has been ruptured because of
humanity’s improper loves. These improper loves have created an unhealthy distance
between God and man and the relationship needs mending, thus forgiveness and
repentance are necessary. Forgiveness, the quintessential example of a gift, will be a
central topic within this chapter. This section will also survey Milbank’s perspective of
finite gifts, as they reflect the Divine gift. Milbank gives us his phenomenology of
forgiveness and this perception of finite forgiveness sheds light on how he sees the
infinite form. This gift provides a limitless example of Milbank’s conception of divine
love.
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Ontology of the Divine Gift
The gift, for Milbank, is not so much of an ontological category, as much as it is a
way of understanding ontology. 121 Albeit, ontology informs the gift correspondingly, for
to accept the gift is to honor being. The Divine gift established creatures’ being, but this
is being as a gift. 122 Es gibt, or “it gives,” to say that all of creation - - including
humanity - - is a gift. However, the Divine gifts are not univocal to finite gifts. As we
will see later, the finite gift is bound to reciprocity, and this is due to the necessary
distance between the giver and the receiver, a territory that belongs “neither to donor nor
donee.” However, the Divine gift “passes across no neutral abyss” and is not bound to
space between the giver and receiver. This is because God owns all territory; there is no
neutral - - or secular - - space which would result in a delay of the gift. The Divine gift,
121
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then, begins with God and goes directly to the receiver. The lack of distance between
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The Divine and his intended recipient lends to the steady and continuous flow of the gift.
There is no shut off valve to God’s gift; it is inexorable. God does not hesitate in gift
giving because, in his omniscience, there is no uncertainty. This certainty allows him to
be most freely giving and freely loving.

Divine Love in The Divine Gift
Milbank recognizes God’s gift as the infinite, perfect “return of himself to
himself” and as such, “grounded in an intra-divine love.” 123 Intra-Divine love has always
been exchanged between the three persons of the God-head. Instead of a circle of love,
this community looks much more like a spiral with the ends attached through which love
is constantly flowing in, around, and emanating through to the finite. This emanation is a
gift to the finite beings, as they are invited into the play of love in the spiral, the infinite
intra-trinitarian love.
Now, it is necessary that we see the reason for why Milbank focuses on the finite
gift exchange – all in order to show the boundaries of finite gifts and, by association,
finite loves. This in turn highlights Divine love as a beacon - - a wholly-other love which
is unbounded yet impenetrable. Milbank concludes that only can God’s gift be
considered the pure, exemplary gift, “whose absolute gratuity and spontaneity removes it
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from all taint of exchange.” 124 This is clearly a distinction from the finite gift giver; one

who is bound by exchange. Divine gifts do not necessarily exist as reciprocal, they need
not be because all Divine gifts, in one way or another, return to him. 125 Milbank agrees
with Marion in his suggestion that “the giving traverses distance by not ceasing to send
the given back to the giver.” 126 God’s gift avoids neutral territory and whether accepted
or not, it returns back to him. The gift necessarily represents and refers back to God as
the giver; it is self-disclosing. It is God who reveals himself, as love, as the gift and
interested in reciprocation with a recipient. A central component of the Divine gift is that
it not only represents the giver by its composition, but also its direction or intended
recipient. The Divine gift, though not necessarily, has recipients, and as such is intended
to be reciprocal. Milbank considers this reciprocity to be infinite gift-exchange.

Gift Exchange
God’s giving love should not be considered antithetical to his receiving love, for
“even within his own Trinitarian life, God is not just a free-giving; he is equally a
constant receiving.” 127 It is absolutely essential to not simply see God as the
quintessential giver, but also the exemplary receiver, for his gift giving must always have
a gift return. Perhaps it is more difficult for one to receive than to give, for reception and
acceptance forges an increase in one recognizing her state as one who is in need, or one
124
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who is willing to accept the sacrifice of another. When considered seriously, a humble
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reception seems to be, at times, impossible. Nevertheless, our finite categories of giving
and receiving cannot apply to the infinite God, who is not bound to finite classification.
The Divine expresses both giving and receiving simultaneously; and this points to the
chasm of distance between these acts of God and those of man.
There is an organic distance between God and man, as they are wholly others; yet
there is also a distance created by depravity, which results in a rupture in the giftexchange. 128 We do violence to reality - - and to our gifts - - when we attempt refuse the
gift. In the act of love, God provides a connection between himself and man in order to
prevent this violence and harm. It is the gift of an inter-relatedness; a correspondence
and reciprocity. The specification of what or who something is will be shaped by his or
its giftedness. 129 And the question of what a gift is will be shaped by who the giver is - who, in this case, is the Divine. For if man is a gift, then being as such will be under a
constant revision, always changing, always being given. This understanding of being
will be quite distinct from the modern ontologies on offer today. Different in that this
concept posits a creator and sustainer of being; distinct because modern ontology asserts
128
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an autonomy of created beings to a fault. Instead, for Milbank, all actions of finite
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creatures which occur through dilectio, or rightly guided love, are in a sense hooked or
fastened to the infinite. They must occur through him. Milbank suggests that “God alone
fully gives without contrast and gives, unilaterally, a reciprocity, nevertheless every finite
gift to some extent anticipates and starts to provide, through educative influence of the
other, its own counter-gift.” 130 All gifts which man may give first originated as gifts to
him. Love is an endowment one may give to others simply because Divine love was, and
is, first given. All of man’s love, then, exists as a counter-gift.
Gifts must replicate themselves “in cycles of gratitude and obligation;” this is
what perpetuates love as gift(s) and gift(s) as love. Also, Milbank’s gift-exchange must
always feature delay and non-identicial repetition. 131 Gifts of humanity can only occur
because of God’s first gifts of love for, as Milbank concludes, “this is the one given
condition of the gift, that we love because God first loved us.” 132 Milbank seeks to
establish that “human generosity belongs within the context of prior attachments,” and
therefore “a reflection upon erotic love is not irrelevant to an elucidation of agapeic
donation.” 133 There is a way in which the erotic love can inform us of Divine love, for it
is a form created by the Divine through which his love may be expressed (intensely)
through people. Milbank wants to show the continuum between “agape, a giving love,
and eros, a desiring love,” 134 for on the contemporary theological scene, there is far too
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sharp a contrast between the two. He appeals to the human eros –this eros, this desire, is
itself a gift – which is only possible because of gift exchange, for it exists as a reflection
of agape. This necessarily links the two, for desire is facilitated and fulfilled in the
instance of giving and reciprocation.
Milbank suggests that perhaps one of the first gifts God gives humanity is a

mirror; a reflexivity through which he can receive the gift given. This gift is the ability to
look upon oneself as a gift and be thankful. On this topic of reflexivity, Milbank
summons Claude Bruaire, who argues that in the moment of creation the first gift was
given and received, and as such, subsists “as the reflexive reception of itself as gift,
which means the giving of a gift to itself, in an inadequate attempt to make the return of
gratitude to the ultimate source.” 135 That is, in the moment of the ex nihilo creation, man
was able to recognize, to perceive himself as gift and offering. This sort of recognition
was the natural response for man, that is, until he began looking for places God was not.
For Milbank, this refusal marked the beginning of human deprivation.

Humanity’s Post-Lapsarian Need
Milbank is concerned with “the restoration of a refused and ruptured gift,” 136 as
our world is one of fallen-ness. Man is diagnosed with a sort of disease in this broken
world and his depraved state is only truly known through Divine love as grace. 137 Grace
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gives that which is lacking to the finite who are in need of reconciliation with the Divine.

Instead of humanity needing to be destroyed, Milbank would suggest that humanity needs
to be fulfilled, regenerated and set free. 138 Milbank here appeals to Henri de Lubac’s
understanding of grace as it is “a Divine gift that supplies a supernatural lack basic to our
very nature and yet prior to our natural being.” 139 “Basic” because it is most authentic
for man to live in accordance and interaction with the supernatural, and “prior to our
natural being” because grace has always been within The Divine. That is, he did not
evolve into a being who developed into being graceful once humanity was born - - no,
God, as a simple being who acts in the world, has always been this grace. Though
humanity is inorganically bent towards deviance and immorality, one can turn from this
iniquity into his most natural –yet still finite -being, an existence of being in communion
with the Divine.
This is why Milbank sees the theurgy of the incarnation as God’s breaking into
the world and reintroducing love in a new way. This incarnation is the preeminent gift,
for through it God seeks to counteract man’s selfishness and death. However, even
selfishness is a form of love, for Milbank. 140 Like Augustine, Milbank would pose sin to
be a form of love inappropriately bent towards targets of non-value or things which do
138
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not perpetuate one’s communion with God; improper loves. Sin then, is a love in which

“one has cut oneself off from the source of life which is God; out of a weak fear and need
for security founded in self one has established the kingdom of weakness which is death
and dying.” 141 Sin is the refusal of the gift of love donated by God. Therefore the result
of humanity’s refusal of the gift is an attempt at autonomous survival and defense against
the gifts of God. This “kingdom of weakness” perpetuates the problem of injurious
independence as it makes man feeble and weak. All of these - autonomy, security and
defense - are the responses of the refusal of the gift. Part of the agony of this refusal is
that man is in need, and clearly so, for God gives to restore man’s ability to receive.
Milbank poses that “creation and grace are gifts; Incarnation is the supreme gift; the Fall,
evil and violence are the refusal of gift; atonement is the renewed and hyperbolic gift that
is for-giveness.” 142 This refusal of the gift correlates with the very logic as to why
humanity needs the gift. This is man’s circular search for love; he is looking for the very
love he consciously and unconsciously rejects - - a love that is only found in the
incarnation and atoning work of Christ. This is an act of true forgiveness, but as gifts
they must be received.

Forgiveness
Milbank is convinced that theology, beginning in the high mediaeval period, has
been posited with a legacy of forgiveness that is primarily a positive endeavor; that is,
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human who has fallen from it. This is only a half-truth, and as such, is to the detriment of
man. This is in high contrast with the antique understanding of forgiveness as a solely
negative gesture. 143 One which sees forgiveness to solely be God taking away the sins of
the world without the creation of a positive debt. Instead of forgiveness being either one
or the other, Milbank sees it to be a two-sided venture. He seems to agree with the early
Christian ideology, which posed that “negativity was doubly qualified by something
positive. In fact, the positivity of forgiveness was the counterpart to the negativity of
evil.” 144 So here, within Milbank’s line of thought, there is both a negative component
and a positive component to the act of forgiveness, and because of this, forgiveness
should not be considered as a gesture of either solely removal or simply attribution.
Instead, remission should be considered in way in which both are intertwined and occur
mutually, for in the negative gesture a positive one is found and vice versa.
Forgiveness must be an act against sin in general, and the individual violations in
particular. Divine love does not simply nullify misdeeds but properly negates them by
paying the debt. Milbank poses that “perhaps forgiveness, since it gives up, or forswears
a legitimate ground of complaint, suggests a kind of negative giving which benignly
removes – the giving of a gift which fortunately destroys.” 145 Forgiveness is, in part, a
negative gesture, or “giving”, that restores by expulsion. Man subsists because God
inexplicably removes the debt of sin. It is a gesture that leaves the individual unmarked
and clean in the newness of God’s creation (II Cor. 5:17). The negative gesture
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recreates. Though forgiveness is, in part, a negative gesture that takes away, it still
maintains its status as a gift. God’s cancellation of the debt accrued by the violator is a
negative gesture packaged as a gift to the violator: a gift that removes the malignant
offenses from the individual and newly recreates her; a gift that institutes a positive debt,
gladly received.
1. Augustine’s Understanding of Time and its relation to Forgiveness
For Augustine, there is a supreme gift which man both desires to receive and to
give the most. For charity, or love, is “indeed the supreme gift.” 146 If this love comes
from God then such love is both exemplary and supreme. Forgiveness is a reflection of
this supreme gift, it is essential in Divine love vis-à-vis humanity; it is charity, bearing
the burden of sin. Without a forgiving love, there can be no giving love as the two are
inseparable. Both forgiveness and time will forever remain as a mysterium as neither can
be fully understood phenomenologically, but in order for forgiveness to be more clearly
understood, the aspect of time must be examined. Milbank suggests that Augustine
realized “forgiveness in time demanded drastic ontological revision, if certain aporias
were to be overcome.” 147 That is, if forgiveness is to be understood at all, there must be a
dialectic between time and being. In order for any event of forgiveness to occur, the one
who forgives must traverse, in a certain sense, the distance of time past. Milbank
recognizes the relevance of Augustine’s understanding of time as it relates to forgiveness,
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as Augustine sees God as capable of having a unilateral relation to time. That is, God is
not simply moving along with the rest of creation through the hours of the day, but may
return to points in time and leap forward to others. In order for forgiveness to occur at
all, there must be a recreation of the event in which one offended another; enter God’s
time warping abilities. This enterprise of forgiveness is not humanly possible as Man
cannot recreate the past any more than he can manipulate the future. A finite looking
back cannot lend to true forgiveness for true forgiveness, in some sense, requires a total

recreation of the past event, not just a re-narration, or depth of understanding. Therefore,
human forgiveness must depend upon the Divine forgiving love. A love, which comes as
a gift, through infinite means into the phenomenal realm, originating in God.
The present is quite different for God than for man. For as Rogers concludes,
“Augustine, in his classic treatment of the nature of time and eternity in his Confessions
describes God's eternal present as being like a present moment of time, but entirely
immutable.” 148 Instead of God being bound to the finite, linear, chronological process of
time, which humanity is bound to, he is capable of being in an eternal, infinite present.
God’s acting synchronically in time makes forgiveness entirely possible. Man does not
have the ability to go back into the past and relive it as a present moment, and he is
therefore unable to commit the negative gesture of forgiveness – the disinfection and
wiping away of the misdeeds of the violator.
As considered earlier, the goal of forgiveness is not simply to cancel negative debt
but also to create a positive one which results in the reinstitution of reciprocal gift giving.
148
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“restore that order of free unlimited exchange of charity which was interrupted by sin.” 149
Forgiveness is an active love that restores the flow of love between two parties. Divine
forgiveness reinstitutes man’s ability to love by breaking through his iniquity and actively
pursuing the restoration of his relationships with others, and this makes the forgiveness of
humanity possible, subsisting in Divine love. Humans are incapable of truly forgiving in
the way God does, but there is a sense in which one may forgive appropriate to her finite
possibilities.150 All forgiveness is dependent upon God because of humanity’s finite
limitations and our problem(s) of sin - - this is a critical aspect of God’s love, for he
understands this infestation within humanity. For God, the quality of love is not strained;
it is a love without regard and fear of sins effects upon him. Therefore he does not fear
forgiveness - - he does not hesitate out of concern for himself, as man does. This is
precisely why man must depend upon God for true reconciliation and harmony.

2. Forgiveness: A Reflection of the Ontological Bond
Man cannot adequately dispel evil and consequently must depend upon God to
defeat it. Milbank once again appeals to the participatory system of forgiveness (and ipso
facto, love) that is established in order to both cultivate the bond between God and man,
and to deal appropriately with evil. For Milbank “charity is…the ontological bond
149
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between God and creatures, whereby creatures only are as the receiving of the divine gift
and the unqualified return of this gift in the very act of receiving.” 151 This participation
necessitates the passing on of the gift given, for it requires a return upon reception.
Reciprocity is demanded in the Divine gift, and this creates a union. The ontological
bond between God and man is delicto, or love, and it is only through man’s recognition
and acceptance of Divine love that he can love as originally intended. Forgiveness, as a
specific gift of love, is the ideal topic to consider this ontological bond. To forgive is to

re-establish the reciprocal relationship that was, foremost, intended by God in the original
creation of man. Therefore in God’s forgiving of man there is an ontological ambition,
one through which The Divine re-hooks himself to man; that is, the act of God’s
forgiving restores one’s being and doing with God. Therefore, both the means and the
result of this restoration is love. Man receives the gift and by doing so, loves. This also
results in one having love and forgiveness for others, which builds up the double love of
God and neighbor, for man accordingly, after being forgiven and repentant, can begin to
love others properly.
3. Man’s Participation in Forgiveness
God has given man the ability to participate in the act of forgiveness: to consider
and reconsider the evil acts committed towards him; and to be forgiven - - to accept the
charitable gift and to actively pursue repentance and rapprochement throughout. Milbank
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recognizes that one who is offended by another is warranted to be so as he has a vital
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reflex to turn from evil and act against it. 152 This should not be ignored. An offended
one One should have an appropriate reproving response to the evil act, and she should see
this response as a built-in way to deal with this human problem of depravity. However, it
is essential for one to handle this response properly, for he has, himself, labored against
sin and offended others. The victim is also a violator, though perhaps not in this specific
circumstance. The victim is not far from committing the same misdeeds as his violator,
and he must take this into account. This identification opens is what connects the victim
and the violator and vise versa. Without identification one may not step into another’s
shoes and see – albeit dimly – an occurrence through another’s eyes. This sort of kinship
makes for the possibility of forgiveness, as it opens up the possibility of understanding
another. The victim cannot turn a deaf ear to his prior detestation and must “situate and
qualify this hatred in relation to a renewed understanding of the deluded motives of his
violator.” 153 Milbank recommends that a victim can only find redemption in a
relationship through re-narration, or a re-telling of the story in which she was wronged.
This re-narration posits within the story the perspective that the violator is wrenched and
deprived, and must be donated, through grace, the gift of forgiveness. Though a victim
may play a role in the forgiveness of another, she cannot create contrition in the violator.
Milbank employs a Thomistic understanding of repentance; one through which he
suggests that only Divine forgiveness can produce repentance. This Divine forgiveness,
when accepted by the violator, necessarily produces repentance, or metanoia. This
152
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repentance is the positive act of forgiving and it is to the detriment of evil. Though man

cannot excite repentance in another, he must hope for it, otherwise forgiveness will only
be a finite venture, which doesn’t perpetuate any reflection or change in the violator.
When one forgives another, she must see the act as cooperative with the Divine. Milbank
proposes that in the Middle Ages “the aim of forgiveness was not a lone, self-righteous
certainty of the will to exonerate,” but rather to pay attention to the circumstances and
repentance of the violator through charity. This was a time period in which charity was
“regarded less as a performance than as a state of fraternal, friendly and harmonious coexistence. The aim, in other words, was reconciliation, where the bond of love is an
exchange of infinite love.” 154 The trajectory of forgiveness was not to simply say that a
violator was no longer accountable for his actions, but that there was love shared between
the two which excites rapprochement and an interest in restoring the interrelatedness.
Milbank supports this type of forgiveness: one where there is an equal amount of
forgiveness in both parties and where they go to and return from God with a proper love
for the other. Divine love is then shared between and amidst people, because this sort of
forgiveness necessitates direct involvement with The Divine. This seems to line up quite
nicely with what we know of God’s interest in forgiving humanity. That is, there are
correlations between his forgiveness of man and man’s forgiveness of others, just as there
is commonality between man’s love and God’s love. Man’s participation in forgiveness
is totally dependant upon his being forgiven and his trust in God, for forgiveness may
only subsist through Divine love, grace and “as real by human faith.” 155 For Milbank,
forgiveness can be considered as a matter of dependence. Instead of one attempting to
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absolve with another in a finite way, one must trust that God loves her enough to provide
reconciliation through repentance and a restoration of harmony between parties. This
dependence upon The Divine must necessarily revivify love between the two parties as it
existed before the violation.
Forgiveness also has communal implications. Forbearance, as an offering,
“ensures the perpetuation of ecclesia, the agapeic community, as a series of settlements
out of court (Matthew 18:15-17; I Cor. 6:1-8).” 156 As God’s forgiveness of man
infiltrates society, and man in turn participates in forgiving others, there is a way in

which The Church becomes a community of forgiveness, and thus driven by a new desire
or repayment of a positive (no longer negative) debt. That is, a new desire, or love,
which shapes all other desires. A Christian desire that is not only preemptive of sin but
also a desire that is free giving. The Radically Orthodox Graham Ward points out that
“Christian desire is always excessive, generous beyond what is asked.” This desire draws
upon the Trinity as an enclosed society - - a community within God which is determined
upon giving. Therefore Ward concludes that Christian desire is “ultimately founded upon
God as triune and, as triune, a community of love fore-given and given lavishly.” 157 The
Trinity is to be the model for the Church as a forbearing community and as a model for
giving, for within the Trinity is a grand narrative of giving and contribution. A narrative
which perhaps came to the climax in the supreme gift, the incarnation.

Humanity’s Gift Giving: a Finite Phenomenon
156

John Milbank, “Can a Gift Be Given? Prolegomena to a Future Trinitarian Metaphysic,” Modern
Theology, (11, 1995), 119.
157
Graham Ward, Cities of God, (New York NY: Routledge, 2002), 77.

78

As one could suspect, Milbank’s position on finite gift giving pales in comparison
to that of the Divine. The human gift, though it can be given with liberty, is “most free
where it is yet most bound, most mutual and most reciprocally demanded.” 158 This goes
to say that on finite terms, without a receiver’s acceptance of a gift, it cannot be a gift.
The offer of a “place at a university” is not a gift. It only becomes such when it is
accepted; when one begins his study at the university. 159 On finite terms, a gift must
necessarily change hands; it must pass from one to another through neutral space; this is
what marks a gift as such. If a gift does not change hands in a way that shifts the
ownership of the gift, then there is no instance of gift giving. Also, a gift must involve
reciprocation, and this can be found even in the acceptance of the gift, for acceptance
means that one says yes to the gift, takes it, and agrees to be the new owner of said

gift. 160 This marks, for Milbank, a necessary condition for finite gift giving, and will be a
distinguishing factor between the infinite and the finite gifts. The finite gift must be
accepted, and is therefore in some sense a bond or agreement.

Gift and Contract
There is, within the current milieu, a sharp distinction between legal contract on
the one hand, and gift on the other hand. It is predominantly accepted that a gift can be
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given with no prior attachment or agreement, and can essentially be a “free gift” with no
strings attached. There is a sense in which a gift in modern society is understood to be

“non-compulsory” and the giver may be unaffected by the response of the recipient. The
difference between the modern sentiments of liberty and those of Milbank is that for
Milbank’s finite gift there must be reciprocity; and for the modern thinker, there is a
unilateral openness to finite gift giving. Here, gratuity paid at a restaurant provides a
sufficient example. A tip to the waiter is a gift – one in which the customer may choose
the amount and give generously more than one could anticipate. 161 Nonetheless it is an
expected free gift, so much to where the waiter works his personal budget around
receiving this gift. This type of gift is a reward for a deed well done, yet it is always
within the power of the giver to restrain from giving it. However, though it is expected, it
does not compromise the tip’s identity as a gift freely given because of the choices
wrapped up in its donation.
In considering the somewhat compulsory aspect of a gift and the obligatory status
of a contract, Milbank recognizes the necessity of juxtaposing the two, and in doing so,
appeals to Pierre Bourdieu’s two features of a gift. 162 The first is that in order for a gift to
be such, there must be a delay of return. For example if a sick mother in the hospital
were to receive flowers, then her response should not be to immediately reach under her
bed and donate flowers in return. This actually implies a lack of thankfulness as a result
of the bed-ridden individual’s impulse to repay the favor and remove the debt accrued as
a result of receiving a gift. The second of Bourdieu’s features of a gift is that the counter161
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gift must have some dissimilarity from the gift originally given. This does not overrule

equivalence or similarity between gifts, but simply rules out a counter-gift being the exact
same gift originally given. For example if one were to receive a pony, named Flash, from
a friend for his birthday, then the recipient’s counter-gift cannot be Flash. This would
make a parody of the gift exchange, and would insinuate that the recipient either didn’t
accept the gift or had the pony on loan. Both of Bourdieu’s features help distinguish the
gift from the contract, but nonetheless even “the freest gift is still ‘contaminated’ by
contract.” 163 This leads to some sort of gift-exchange because of the expectation in the
giver and receiver. Milbank suggests that the only way to maintain a gift as such and not
hold it as euphemistic for contract is to see that gifts are given with elements of gratuity,
and this gesture makes it irreducible to contract. 164 If the gift cannot be distinguished
from contract then all is obligation, and love cannot be a burden or duty, it must be free
and celebratory.

Milbank’s conception of the Gift as it relates to the Ecclesial Community
What should the telos of the Church be as it relates to humanity? The aim of the
church should be to love the poor. Who then, are the poor? What qualifies one as
impoverished? As considered in chapter two, perhaps all persons are impoverished in the
sense that they desire and love out of necessity, out of need. When one needs, and lacks
the ability to fulfill said need, there is a sense in which the need may only be filled by
163
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gift to the one in need. 165 This concept of “the gift” is intimately connected to need, and
consequentially, love and desire, and this is a concept that persons in the Church should
take, receive and give to others.
There is a sense in which the Church - - and society at large - - does not pay
attention to gifts as they are constantly and persistently given, re-given and sustained.
Instead, once something has been given, it is owned and possessed by the receiver, and
this is the end of exchange as it relates to that specific gift. Perhaps this is a limited way
of viewing gifts, and it may benefit the Church to consider gifts a bit differently.
Neverthelss, we do not want to emphasize here that gifts may be taken back or are not
actually owned by the receiver once given, but rather that each gift is sustained and
preserved by God. For Milbank, Divine gifts are infinitely sustained, reflecting the
constant participatory spirit between humanity and the Divine. If all things given are
being perpetually sustained, even after the initial exchange, then such sustaining deserves
a new sense of gratitude from the Church. Such sustaining of gifts reflects God’s
goodness, for only a God who is benevolent would sustain good gifts. This should reinstill the Church’s faith in God and his goodness, and consequentially, evoke a fresh
thankfulness from the Church. 166
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Similarly, human love exists because “God first loved us.” Perhaps this also
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reflects God’s perpetual sustainment of man. God does not simply love man once, and in
so doing, wind up humanity’s ability to love. Perhaps instead, every single love is
perpetuated and sustained. That is, even down to one’s love for brushing one’s own teeth
is a love sustained because of God’s first love. Every good love has a Divine origination,
and Milbank sees the normative New Testament notion affirming, “that wherever love
and mercy are shown, there divine charity is present.” 167 A re-assessment of such Divine
presence would greatly benefit every aspect of how the Church loves in response to
Divine love.
Another way in which Milbank may help the church re-consider itself is through
his concept of exchange. Because exchange -- gift giving – is prized, the church operates
with intentions and hopes for others which come in cycles of gift exchange – movements
outside of oneself directed towards the highest good of others, sustained by gratitude.
This concept of gift-giving then turns one from being inward to expressing outwardly
towards those within his life, and this is worship -- the very telos of the church. Worship
leads a community into deeper fellowship with The Divine, and opens one’s horizon up
to the beatific vision of life with God. Whenever one reaches out from herself towards the
good of the other, there is participation, worship and ethics.
The Church needs to “think again God’s love, and think creation as a
manifestation of that love.” 168 Humanity was not created because God needed someone,
(for The Triune God existed as a community within himself) but rather was given out of
167

John Milbank, The Suspended Middle: Henri De Lubac and the Debate Concerning the Supernatural,
(Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Pub, 2005), 22.
168
John Milbank, The Word Made Strange: Theology, Language, Culture. Cambridge, (MA: Blackwell
Publishers, 1997), 50.

83

the natural process of love within the Trinity; because of the excess of love. The natural
entailment of the Triune love was the creation of humanity: a people who can commune
with The Triune God. This excess of love, this creation out of love is a gift. As such,
The Church can once again see the exchange and reciprocity that occurs with God every
time one chooses to love. When one enters the Trinitarian fellowship, she is to return to
her world with excess love. For John Milbank, this concept of exchange is prized as the

very heart and soul of the Church, though great care should be taken to not speak entirely
conclusively on the subject for it is, ultimately, a sacred mystery hidden in the intraTrinitarian life of God.
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CHAPTER 5
THE APORIA OF DIVINE LOVE

The infinite God is “off-limits,” yet gives himself to the finite in revelation. God
is pure mystery for humanity, yet finite beings may experience and understand in part.
God is ho on, and has reminded us of his depth and transcendent nature as the “I AM.”
Though this message of transcendence has come through finite means, which suggest his
immanent presence in the finite realm, this does not lead one to assume any sort of
Divine finitude, for though he has revealed himself, (Deus Revelatus), he has only done
so in part (Deus Absconditus) - - this supports Milbank’s conclusion that God has and
will always maintain a mysterious nature. For as we will see, Milbank maintains this
transcendent and mysterious God to be wholly other than man yet still offer a way for
finite persons to participate with him in the world. Thus, Milbank seems to straddle the
border between transcendence and immanence, as it relates to the Divine. Throughout
this chapter it will become clear that Milbank also attempts to straddle this border with
Divine love as well. Due to Milbank’s subscription to the traditional version of the

Doctrine of Divine Simplicity, God’s love, though able to be experienced, will always
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remain, in some sense, a mysterium.
How then do we identify Divine love? Can we create a method for being able to
better grasp Divine love in the instances in which we see it in the finite realm? Milbank
suggests that “we can’t give these [identity conditions] in advance else we’d be able to
trap and catch God like a butterfly. But Divine love is both the light we see all by and the
things seen. When these two almost fuse, that’s the closest we’re getting.” 169 Milbank
would suggest that at the end of the day, Divine love is an aporia, or some sort of puzzle
that will not be figured out, for “though we glimpse a solution” we do not fully
understand it. An example of the mysterious nature of Divine love would be in the
infinite-finite gift exchange. In this exchange, “Divine love asks [for] no return and yet
its entirely experienced throughout as the grateful return we make else its not experienced
at all.” 170 The Divine, loving gift is qualified by the individual’s acceptance and
reciprocation, and without these, the individual did not receive the gift.
Milbank would contend that even before the fall of man Divine love was
mysterious. It was not sin that caused man to lose full knowledge of God, instead man
never had full knowledge of himself, much less God. Therefore, one cannot have the
expectation to ever be so redeemed as to fully know, in an infinite way, Divine Love.
However man can fully experience Divine love, but only to the hilt of his finite capacity.
There is a proper gap between the finite and the infinite; the post-lapsarian state of
humanity is not entirely to blame for this distance between God and man, as there is a
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natural component to the space between humanity and the Divine. If it were not for this
space there would be no difference, no actual dissimilarity that would lead to
communion. 171 Therefore, Divine love has never been a solely phenomenological
venture, for love is bound up in the distance between two persons or beings. Man was,
and still is, finite; bewildered by, and grasping for the infinite. Though one is able to

love, it is with a fragmented love, which must be refined. This wisp of love exists only as
an imitation of the infinite love that may never be fully understood.
For Milbank, one’s pursuit into understanding Divine love is an advance as
measureless and infinite as one’s pursuit of God. It is a quest never to be complete. This
is how Divine love must be, for if man’s love “does not analogically participate in simple
and infinite love, then a supposedly ‘clear’ grasp of its formality precludes any further
(and endless) advance into its mystery…” 172 This mystery would then result in a
permanent secret, shut in God. The result of such a view would end in love “inescapably
obscure,” rendering it unthinkable, undoable and unspeakable for man. Instead, it is
thinkable, though fragmentarily at best. The Gift - - in this case The Holy Spirit - - has
ushered man into the Trinitarian exchange, a communion where love has been infinitely
shared.
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Love as Analogical
“Love is analogical, not univocal…” for the love of things “is only analogous to
the higher love of persons and this in turn to the love of God.” 173 Milbank means to
suggest that we can only speak of Divine love in so far as we can speak of it analogously,
in a comparative way (e.g. love is grace, love is like a bomb, love is in our hearts, love is
in the lion’s mane, etc.). Love is itself an analogy, and must be spoken of as such - Divine love must be spoken of with an intentional ambiguity so to not misspeak of
Divine love. Therefore, we must speak of Divine love on the terms of how humanity
experiences it: through the love of things and of persons. For Milbank, Divine love must
be spoken of analogically because it cannot be spoken of with certitude in a way that the
vast, infinite difference between man and God is not recognized. Finite love is also
mysterious and “is complexly spoken of and exemplified just because it is an incurably
imprecise analogical concept that indicates no reality other than the mysterious fact that
certain diverse experiences and feelings appear…” 174 Clearly for Milbank, the topic of
love must be approached with a certain cautiousness; to speak of Divine love is to speak
of the Divine.
Milbank does not suggest going about the search for Divine love in a modern
way. One’s modern pursuit of certitude can be analogous to a pirate going on a treasure
hunt, collecting hints along the way of where the treasure is, and once all of the puzzle’s
components are figured out he can fully understand the location of the treasure; in this
173
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complexity which the Pirate must discover. The treasure is fully understood, and thereby
loses its value for what sort of potential it no longer may hold for said pirate. This, for
Milbank, is not how one should go about the search for God or Divine love - - all in order
to deduce his whereabouts, fully disclose him, and reveal his secret hiding place for all
the world to see. God has not fully disclosed himself but has, on the contrary, left much
to be (if ever to-be) discovered. It is in this line of thought that Milbank once again
critiques Marion for having a far too determinate theory of love. Marion seizes the
possibility of stripping Divine love away from The Divine Being, and therefore making
love a subject that is capable of being fully digested. This supposed exhaustion of the
topic of love is dichotomous with Milbank’s Doctrine of Divine Simplicity where he
would propose that God is as a simple being, one not composed of different attributes,
but essentially acting as love, as a simple being.

An Augustinian Doctrine of Divine Simplicity
In Milbank’s view there is no partitioning of God’s attributes. For Milbank, to
speak of God’s love is to necessarily speak of his essence. Humanity cannot fully speak
of God’s essence and therefore, as Milbank concludes, one cannot fully speak of God’s
love. Milbank attests to a view that abandons the idea of properties in God and instead
sees love as an act of who God is. He proposes that it is best to see God not as a complex
being in the way that we see human persons (i.e. beings who express properties
composed together to make the whole person), but rather as a simple being composed of

one esse. Milbank appeals to an Augustinian Doctrine of Divine simplicity, one which
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denies that God has any properties. For Rogers this version of The Doctrine of Divine
Simplicity (henceforward referred to as DDS) submits that God is not a set of properties
but instead “is an act... an eternal, immutable, absolutely simple act.” 175 Though Milbank
does not see God as housing properties, this does not necessarily disrupt God’s
personhood. Though, of course, Divine personhood would not be the same as that which
characterizes humanity.
Milbank agrees with Augustine’s version of the DDS. Augustine held to what is
now considered the traditional Doctrine of Divine Simplicity, one which asserts that
“God simply is an act, and all the words we use to describe God refer to this act.” 176 God
is not made up of actions or attributes, but the actions essentially are who God is. Rogers
concludes that the traditional doctrine “depends on an entire system of classic
metaphysical assumptions…” 177 which are different than the modern metaphysical
notions. Wolterstorff points out that these assumptions are not like those of modern
ontology, or “relation ontology, and as part of this difference we work with a different
view of essence.” 178 Wolterstorff sees the DDS affirming that God’s “essence or
quiddity is not something other than his being.” 179 That is, God’s existence is not
something distinct or separate from God’s nature.
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Both Augustine and Milbank would insist that God is immutable, and likewise, all
of his acts as he is a “simple” being. 180 God is not because he loves, instead He is as He
is love. If God’s being was dependent upon his expression of love, then God would stand
at the end of a chain of causes within himself. This would threaten his immutability
because of the internal change that would occur as a result of this newly achieved ability
to love. This would look like the Cartesian “causa sui, according to which God is ‘cause
of himself’ rather than [Milbank’s] simple ‘first cause’, or absolute ground of all
causality.” 181 For Milbank, God is the source and ground of all beings and a “God who
loves as he is ‘to be’ according to an absolute, self-grounded necessity.” 182 This is a
reversion to Thomistic sentiments of esse which proclaims God to be the head of
causation, and thus not subject to causality. 183 This reversion must be made now in the
21st century in order to correct the blunders of Modernity.
The Doctrine of Divine Simplicity understands love to be the very essence of
God. This approach turns the modern concept of love on its head, for under the
Augustinian view, love cannot be fully spoken of or explicated. Love is not a topic that
is as exhaustible as say an algebraic theorem - - a chain or link of established and
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accepted truths. Nor can love be measured by drawing a line between two distances as
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the space is marked. Instead, it is in some sense, an aporia, and for Milbank, may remain
so even into the Eschaton. Though the topic of love can be pronounced it cannot be fully
articulated. Further, this does not simply refer to Divine love, but also to man’s love for
things or other persons.

Love of Things
In Augustine’s view, even man’s sin is his love; whatever one moves towards is
his love. Sin is that misguided love which has been warped by the evil in the world. To
sin is to love a thing, person and perhaps even God, improperly. Every-thing which man
puts his energies toward is a result of his love for it, or for some-thing which it will lead
to. 184 Therefore, all desire is shaped by love: love for a thing, this includes the persons of
the Trinity, and one’s neighbor. Every-thing God created should be loved (e.g. trees,
colors and shapes, smells, ), nevertheless things may be loved improperly. 185
For Augustine, there is no distinction between love and rightly directed desire, or
dilectio; the two are almost synonymous, for to desire a thing is to love that thing.
Between Augustine’s use of delicto and amor, there is little distinction as the two are
used interchangeably to describe the love of man for objects and God, and the love of
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God for man. 186 Perhaps we can consider the implications of such a view upon how we
see Divine love. If God’s love is synonymous with his desire and there is no possibility
of his loving a thing improperly - - there are only rightly guided desires in him - - then
God is ever loving, just as he is ever desiring. God’s love is an endless act. 187
In finite loves, to love a thing properly is to recognize its Divine origination and
therefore find it desirable. All things - - including human persons - - ultimately
originated in the Divine and are to be loved as such. For Augustine, even the three
persons of the Godhead are “things.” 188 Perhaps this Augustinian view is what helps
Milbank to conclude that “love of persons cannot be disentangled from love of things

anymore than love itself can be considered apart from being and understanding.” 189 This
is how love seems to work; every act of love communicates the ontological character of
the thing loved and the thing loving, and each moment of love is to be interpreted and
apprehended.
Finite love, as described by Ricoeur, takes all of ones attention from other things
of importance. When man loves, all other objects of one’s concern become less of the
focal point than one particular object or idea as “the discourse of love is initially a
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discourse of praise.” 190 To praise is to focus one’s attention from herself and other things;

to love a thing found to be worth loving. Praise is both an action and a state of being; it is
ethics. In order to love one finds value in the other - - the person, or thing, is worth
praising and love begins for that thing.

Love’s Relation to The “Will”
As noted earlier, Milbank poses that the secular and modern understandings of
love are doomed to lead to nihilism. Because of the intended telos or aim of such a love,
it is bound to be meaningless. The modern concept of love sees little or no distinction
between finite and infinite loves. They are essentially the same thing: an expression,
attribute and an ability to properly care for another. This is in part due to a Cartesian
understanding of the “will.” For “Descartes, [human] will can be univocally equal to
God’s [will].”191 That is, for Descartes, there is no real difference between God’s will and
humanity’s will. Since the finite and infinite wills share the same quality, the Divine will
ends up, by default, looking much like man’s will - - qualified as mere intention and
initiation of action. If God’s will is constructed of the same elements as man’s, then so
too is God’s love, for love is a direct expression of the will. Instead of this faulty
conception of will, Milbank sees will as the place where the finite may participate with
the infinite in decision, pursuit and initiation. Milbank suggests that “’will,’ in
Augustine, names the drastic participatory tension between the infinitely general and the

190

Paul Ricoeur and Mark I. Wallace, Figuring the Sacred: Religion, Narrative, and Imagination,
(Minneapolis MN: Fortress Press, 1995), 317.
191
John Milbank, Personal communication to J.W. Alvis. August 19, 2008.

94

finitely particular.” 192 That is, human will must be understood only as it is inter-related

to the Divine. For if one is willing along side the Divine, then it is necessarily good-will.
The will is “only actual and effective when it wills the good –hence for both Dionysius
and Augustine, it is not exactly the case that evil can be willed; rather there is evil
precisely to the degree that there is an absence of willing. No one, as willing, wills
anything but the good, and evil only affects the will to the extent that a deficient good is
being willed.” 193 Milbank precisely names the will to only be maintained as such when it
is directed towards the good and with God. This is clearly in contrast with the Cartesian
view that sees will as that which may be directed and wielded by a Being apart from the
Divine.
In speaking of his will, “My weight,” says Augustine, “is my love”(pondus meum
amor meus). 194 The will is at the very heart of one’s loving. Augustine proposed that the
“will,” -- or the “potency,” as Milbank suggests -- by which one makes decisions and acts
192
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upon them, is in a sort triune relationship with love and knowledge. In The Trinity,
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Augustine compares the Triune God with man and suggests that within man, there is a
pseudo-triune nature. This tri-unity is made up of will, knowledge and love. Through
better understanding the connections between these three “parts” of man, one will better
understand the Triune God. However, Descartes’ mistake was a drastic one, for
humanity cannot fully understand God by considering this tri-unity of humanity.
Therefore, there is a connection between Descartes’ univocal understanding of the will,
and its affects upon the modern concepts of love and knowledge. Milbank suggests that
this univocal concept of the will “detaches love from knowledge and so from
recognition.” 195 He sees these concepts as necessarily connected, and from here we will
survey Milbank’s consideration of the dialectic between love and knowledge.

Love and Knowledge
Milbank poses that within “secular love is an unknowing unilateral love and so
knowledge is correspondingly a banal symmetrical bond of representation without
love.” 196 Knowledge without love is impossible, for one cannot know anything without
rightly directed desire towards knowing some-thing. The secular pursuit is found in an
over qualification of knowledge that strips it of life, movement and faith, and thus sees it
as stale information which one can cognitively comprehend and store. Instead, Milbank
poses that knowledge seeks to love just as true love seeks to know. “Love, since it is love
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of the known, cannot be fully known only as love.” 197 One’s loving or desiring must
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reflect knowledge of the thing loved or desired. This is not knowledge as simply
information, but also knowledge as experience - - lived experience, that which cannot be
theorized.
The way- - though not the solution - - of attaining understanding of a thing or
idea is to have a collection of knowledge or experiences of other things and ideas.
Milbank suggests that “perhaps love can only be classified by its positive relation to other
genera of being and reflection or else to other semi-transcendental aspects of reality like
knowing and aisthesis.” 198 Love, knowledge and aesthetics are all intimately related to
the good, true and beautiful. In order for one to speak of love, she must speak also of the
other transcendentals. Though Milbank is often found critiquing Marion’s ontology,
there seems to be some commonality between the two as to how to speak of love. For
Marion, the themes of idolatry, the gift and love are so closely linked that one cannot
speak of one without also speaking of the others. 199 This is Milbank’s approach to the
topic of love also, as he rarely speaks of it as a stand alone concept. That is, because of
God’s mysterious nature, there is always a relation which love must have with something
else, an inter-relatedness that love must share with other acts. Because of God’s
simplicity, Milbank cannot speak of Divine love as an autonomous, stand-alone attribute.
Instead, God reflects the unification of love and knowledge, and acts them out
simultaneously in his nature and life; he does not pick and choose which action will fit
for each specific situation.
197
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Love and Affinity
To love something, to have a certain natural draw to someone, this is affinity. For
Milbank, “Affinity is the absolute non-theorizable, it is the almost ineffable. Affinity is
the mysterium. And it is the beyond-the-ethical which alone gives us the ethical, for
without affinity, love can only be the merely moral and immanent command to put the
other first, a self-abasement before the rival egotism of the other…” 200 The good news of
affinity is that it can only be supplied by God, for one’s loving The Divine involves being
akin to him - that is, made in his likeness. Milbank recommends that this image is an
ineffable likeness that spurs on the non-theorizable affinity of another. Affinity is beyond
nature; a supernatural gift. Affinity, or ontological kinship, must be activated through
God’s expression of love. For finite loves must always come from the infinite love.
God’s love must be infinitely distinct from our own. If there is no way in which God
could possess or maintain a love greater than our own, and we are left up to our own
finite means of attaining that love, then there is no basis for love. At best, humans may
express finite love to its fullest capacity, but because of the privation of humanity even
this ability has been scarred. Human love is, and can only be, a pale reflection of the
obscure, mysterious and infinite love. 201
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Divine love as an Aporia, and its relation to the Ecclesial Community
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As mentioned in previous sections, Milbank sees modernity to have made its way
through the doors of the church. This time, modernity has given a false impression of
God, one that leaves him static and straightforward. God has been deduced, and this
leaves him transfixed between humanity and divinity; that is, we know God’s capacities
and limits because he is limited to how we perceive him. This consideration of God
leaves the church content with the familiar and known God, and does not leave room for
any discovery or newness in and through him, nor does it allow for any sort of awe
towards such a God. One’s satisfaction and contentment with her understanding of the
Divine (and ultimately his love) results in her losing interest in exploration. In one’s
making the reduction of God’s love to a theorem, she is requiring that God perform
within the parameters of such a theorum. This sort of disallowance is a fateful flaw for all
persons of the church. It is a loss for all when one reduces the love of God to a trite
concept or a fully penetrable phenomenon.
It seems as if this mistake may be traced back to the modern conception of
progress; where man’s ability to love is growing along with his knowledge and
technological prowess. Man is getting closer to divinity, day by day. This sort of
modern thinking leads the Church to believe that Divine love is, in effect, fully penetrable
and knowable. In attempting to glorify human love, we do injustice to how we consider
Divine love, and are ultimately guilty of making the infinite, finite.
Contrarily, Milbank’s message is one of Divine love as it most truly exists in
mysterium tremendum. This view should lead the church to relax its grip on some of the

limitations it has set on God. A mysterious God requires that one have faith in him not

99

just despite the unknown, but precisely because there are things unknown. Though we
may catch glimpses of Divine love, there is most always a sense in which we question it.
When faced with the unknown, we tend to waver and hesitate, we doubt. This sort of
doubt is what makes faith possible, and allows it to change and become greater. Instead
of the Church simply resting in the assurance of doctrine, she should never be content
with her life with the absolute; this life only flourishes in the mode of discovery.
Additionally, the idea of the Divine love as mysterious should provide for the
Church a great encouragement. If it is possible for persons in the Church to embrace
such mystery, then perhaps they may find encouragement in a love much greater than
their own loves; much greater than their needs, much greater than their idea of Divine
love. This should provide a certain sort of excitement in the church, as God’s love is
mysteriously even greater than can possibly be imagined. Such a reminder of the
mystery of God’s love should lead us to see that we are not on our own, and that there is
still more love and goodness to discover in the future.
Another way that the Church may benefit from Milbank’s work is found in the
recognition that everyone always loves some-thing. This concept, as applied to the
Church, should re-arrange some of the ways that sin is viewed. Sinfulness is not simply a
state, but also a multitude of choices to love things inappropriately. A closer look at this
idea may help the Church in dealing more appropriately with sin. Seeing sin as
misguided love seems to be much more appropriate to offering humanity a certain sort of
dignity. If sin can be described as misguided love, and one’s sin as an attempt to love
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properly, then we may offer a greater dignity to others. 202 If individuals are attempting to
love properly and make decisions they think to be best, then perhaps the Christian
community may relax its grip on some inappropriate judgmentalism directed towards
other’s sinfulness. That is to say, in seeing sinfulness as improper love, we may offer
others dignity because the aim of individuals’ love is proper love. Properly

understanding the trajectory of one’s loves helps us to offer a different sort of compassion
towards them, irrespective of their acknowledgement of this.

202

This is not to say, however, that sin, even as misguided love, does not carry with it a dose of healthy
shame and woe. This is also not to say that sin as pure evil should be disregarded or the depraved state of
humanity ignored.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In the introduction to this thesis, we established the tremendous significance of
this topic of love. One’s concept or experience of Divine love is a linchpin to all other
theological streams of thought. It is the crux upon which Christian theology rests, for
without a God of love, the entire system of Christianity must fail. If no God of love then
the Christian story may be committed to the flames. Milbank proposes that “love is the
most perennial human need; Christianity is the religion which most places love at its
heart.” 203 Therefore, as it has been shown, this topic of love is essential for the Church to
understand, for out of such understanding blooms appropriate Christian praxis. Thus, it
has been necessary that we offer Milbank’s re-narrations of that love, in an attempt to
better understand the significance of the topic.
Throughout this paper we have considered John Milbank’s conception of Divine
love, and how it speaks, as a corrective, to the modern misunderstandings of love and
consequentially Divine love. This paper has charted some of the ways the Christian
understandings of these loves have been negatively shaped by modernity. Such negative
influence upon the Church requires, in Milbankian fashion, a sort of re-narration, or re203

John Milbank, “The Future of Love: A reading of Benedict XVI’s encyclical Deus Caritas Est,”
(http://www.theologyphilosophycentre.co.uk/papers/Milbank_TheFutureOfLove.pdf., Date Accessed: April
24, 2008), 1.
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telling of Diving love. Such re-narration calls for a return to pre-modern understandings
of Divine love, and a revival of its importance, breadth and depth in all theological
discourse. The most formidable of Milbank’s contributions is found not in the newness
of RO’s ideas in the theological community, or the avant-garde style of Milbank, but
rather the ways in which RO hopes to re-inject pre-modern theology into our postmodern community, and in so doing, re-focus the Church upon its core beliefs.

This thesis hopes to have untangled the oddities and features of Milbank’s God of
love as well as his explication for his difference from other contemporary considerations.
As we have examined, Milbank considers the phenomenologies of love formed out of the
modern mind to be not at all reflective of the existence of the Christian, triune God. The
secular arrangement of love presumes only a finite future “in terms of this-worldly
success,” however an arrangement which sees love as characterized by the Divine first
love, opens up a future of promise. 204 To love and to be loved is to hope for love. In
order for love to-be, there must always be a future for such love. RO has “continuously
acknowledged that the biblical legacy introduces, in a radical sense, that God is personal
and loving, that he creates, brings about developments within time, and orientates us
towards an eschatological future.” 205 All of these essential components of RO are
necessarily dependant upon their understanding of Divine love.
After establishing the significance of this topic of love, we considered some of the
more general features of RO and Milbank’s theological interests. In so doing, we
established why Milbank’s understanding of love is of particular interest. We have
204

John Milbank, “Scholasticism, Modernism and Modernity,” Modern Theology (22, 2006), 663.
John Milbank, in Rupert Short’s God’s Advocates: Christian Thinkers in Conversation, (Grand Rapids
MI: Eerdmans, 2005.), 107.
205
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shown how Milbank sees love as an act manifested in the world, available to the senses,
and phenomenologically discernable. In order for one to love at all, she must first be

loved by God. This consideration of finite and infinite loves led us into an investigation
of the significant features of Milbank’s participatory ontology, and how participation
marks a very basic and fundamental component of that love. Through his participatory
framework, we considered the characteristics of how such reciprocity lends to giftexchange and ultimately Divine gift-exchange. If Divine love is a gift, then in order to
better understand Divine love, one must also better understand the nature and essence of
a gift and given-ness; to understand Divine love as gift. Lastly we considered Milbank’s
proposal that we are infinitely limited in how we may understand love. Though it is
essential to further consider Divine love, we must live with a present tension, as Marion
concludes, "we live with love as if we knew what it was about. But as soon as we try to
define it, or at least approach it with concepts, it draws away from us.” 206 As shown in
this thesis, Milbank most often speaks of Divine love analogously, thereby avoiding a
univocal claim to understanding it. He reminds us of the carefulness with which we
should approach this topic in his claiming that it is, ultimately, an aporia.
We have considered some of the ways in which Milbank’s understanding of
Divine love may affect the Ecclesial community, and it seems as if the implications are
vast and far-reaching. Like every good theologian, Milbank wants his theology to enter
the doors of the Church, yet he does not necessarily give pragmatic steps for persons to
follow in order to experience God more truly and deeply. Consideration of the ecclesial
206

Jean-Luc Marion, Prolegomena to Charity, Trans. Stephen E. Lewis, (New York: Fordham UP, 2002),
71.
Perhaps, because of Marion’s univocal understanding of finite and infinite loves, finite love ends up
looking more mysterious and open ended, like the infinite love.

implications of Milbank’s thought raises the dialectic between the theoretical and the

104

practical. 207 Blondel notes that “Every doctrine which does not reach the one thing
necessary, every separated philosophy, will remain deceived by false appearances. It will
be a doctrine, it will not be Philosophy.” 208 This seems to expand the definition of
philosophy (and necessarily theology) to include the necessitation of one’s praxis and
action upon her thetic roots or beliefs. For Blondel, in order for one to actually do
philosophy she must have some sort of action or comportment that is a result of her
endeavor. Surely Milbank would agree that one must (not out of a societal expectation,
but a natural necessitation) act upon his or her philosophies and theologies; that is,
Milbank wants to see reason and faith reintegrated, after the modern turn in society which
placed a strict division between the two. 209 Philosophy or theology that is not taken and
believed should not be considered as such. 210 In this sense, should not the role and
purpose of theology in the Church be reconsidered? 211 Milbank hopes to redeem
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Is there a sort of progression which one goes through in order to see practical change? Does practical
change always move from the head, that is the theoretical sphere, or do both constantly inform one another?
If life change is only prompted through theoretical re-configuration, then could it be possible for a person
to simply create her own world by will-power and a re-structuring of their cognitive strata so that they
might believe or live a certain way?
208
Maurice Blondel, quoted in Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro, Naturalism, (Grand Rapids, MI:
William B. Eerdmans Pub, 2008), vi.
209
This is not to say reason has faith in tow, or faith has reason in tow, but rather that the two inform and
are woven into the fibers of one another.
210
John Milbank, “Faith, Reason and Imagination: the Study of Theology and Philosophy in the 21st
Century,” (http://www.theologyphilosophycentre.co.uk/papers.php#milbank posted 2007. Date accessed:
January 26, 2008), 13-19.
See the section of this paper where he considers Pope Benedict’s great Ratisbon address, in which the Pope
diagnoses the ideological problem of the 21st century. Milbank concludes that “The philosophy of the
20thC was predicated on the autonomy of pure reason and the impossibility of metaphysical speculation.
Latterly, however, we have seen the deconstruction of the attempts even to define the limits of what can
properly be known about, whether in the case of Derrida’s critique of Husserl, or Rorty’s consummation of
the critique of the analytic enterprise. Conjoined to this is the collapse of the ideologies of finitude:
positivism, Marxism, Freudianism, even Darwinism. But this has left an appalling vacuum.”
211
John Milbank, “Faith, Reason and Imagination: the Study of Theology and Philosophy in the 21st
Century,” (http://www.theologyphilosophycentre.co.uk/papers.php#milbank posted 2007. Date accessed:
January 26, 2008), 1-6.
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Christianity by expropriating theology from the modern choke-hold, under which it has

been for far too long. Christianity may return to its primordial roots through theological
re-narration, and in so doing, Christian persons may move from the theoretical elements
of true, historical Christianity to the non-thetic experiential ones where persons recognize
the utter significance of participation in and with the Divine and that Divine love. Since
he writes so extensively, it is clearly the case that Milbank believes in the significance of
the theoretical; scholarly theological enterprises have a trickle down effect into the
Church. This reflects the belief that there is a sense in which the thetic relationship one
has with something (e.g. Christian doctrine) will lead to some outflow or comportment in
life qua life. That is, when one has adjusted their noetic structure and belief system to
include, for example, a God who loves, then there is a natural sort of behavior or
comportment that comes along with such a thought or belief. John Milbank personally
recognize the significance of Divine love upon his own life, for as we have seen, he
believes in Divine love, through it, by it, under it and along side it.

see also Dominique Janicaud et al, Phenomenology and the ‘Theological Turn’: the French Debate, trans.
Bernard G. Prusak, (New York: Fordham UP 2000), 5-7.
Janicaud offers more of a polemical view of theology being smuggled back into philosophy via
phenomenology. For Janicaud, Marion, et al, have erred by trying to make phenomenology work for
theological measures. This quest for the “essence of phenomenality” has been in efforts to find that which
is originary or “pure phenomenality.” According to Bernard Prusak, Janicaud claims that this theological
turn in phenomenology can be traced back to the roots of Pope John Paul II in his Fides et Ratio (1998)
where he calls those who are in the field of philosophy to “move from phenomenon to foundation.” For
Marion, phenomenology should be “about” the things which interest phenomenology (i.e. the “things
themselves.”), not about “doing” phenomenology.
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